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FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 7(A)(2) OF
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Steven G. Davison*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision, Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("Defenders of Wildlife Il')' has renewed focus on the
issue of which actions are subject to the procedural and substantive
requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
The 2-1 split panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") transfer of
authority to issue National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permits under section 4022 of the Clean Water Act to the state
of Arizona is a federal agency action subject to section 7(a)(2)3 of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").4 This decision raises the issues of
whether section 7(a)(2) of the ESA5 (1) applies only to actions of federal
administrative agencies over which federal agencies retain "discretionary
Federal involvement or control" and (2) how "discretionary Federal
involvement or control" should be interpreted if the answer to the
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. in E.E., Cornell
University, J.D., Yale Law School.
' 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 450 F.3d 394 (9th Cir.
2006), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. EPA v. Defenders of Wildlife (No. 06-549 Oct.
23, 2006) and Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife (No. 06-340 Sept.
6, 2006) [hereinafter Defenders of Wildife Il].
2 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
3 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
5 Section 7(a)(2) provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of the [Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS)], insure that any action authorized, funded or carried
by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by [the FWS or NMFS] to be critical, unless such agency
has been granted an exemption for such action ....
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preceding question is affirmative. 6 These questions are raised not only
when a federal agency is delegating permit issuing or enforcement
authority to a state, but also in many varying factual situations involving
actions of federal agencies under federal contracts, permits and licenses
that authorize actions of private businesses, individuals and state and local
governments.
This article analyzes the issue of which federal administrative
agency actions are subject to the substantive and procedural requirements
of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Part II analyzes the substantive
requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, and compares section 7(a)(2)'s
substantive requirements to the ESA's provisions that make it unlawful for
any person to "take" any animal that is a member of a fish or wildlife
species that is listed under the ESA as an endangered or threatened
species. The procedural requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, that
may include a biological assessment, consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") or the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS"), a biological opinion from one of these services, and an
incidental take statement from one of these services, are analyzed in Part
III. Part IV's principal focus is on the issue of whether the substantive and
procedural requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA apply only to an
action of a federal administrative agency over which the agency has
"discretionary Federal involvement or control," with analysis including a
focus on how "discretionary" should be interpreted for this purpose. Part
IV analyzes judicial interpretation of the joint regulation that the FWS and
NMFS issued under the ESA that limits the application of section 7 of the
ESA to agency action for which a federal agency retains "discretionary
Federal involvement or control."7 In part IV, this article concludes that the
procedural and substantive requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA
should apply only to an action of a federal administrative agency for
which the agency has discretion to act in manner that can protect ESA-
listed species from the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA. This approach is essentially the test used by the Ninth Circuit Court
6 A regulation issued jointly by the FWS and NMFS limits section 7 of the ESA to
federal agency "actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control."
50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005). This regulation is analyzed in part IV of this article.
7id.
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of Appeals, except for the majority in the Defenders of Wildlife II case, in
determining whether a particular action of a federal agency is subject to
the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Under this approach, the
Defenders of Wildlife II decision should be reversed and the EPA should
not be required to comply with the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA before transferring CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority to a
state. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA should not apply to a nondiscretionary,
ministerial action of a federal agency under another statute that directs that
the agency "shall" take a particular action when specified criteria and
conditions are present, which do not include protection of ESA-listed
species from the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA,
therefore precluding the agency from acting to protect species listed under
the ESA from the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2)).
1I. SECTION 7(a)(2) OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Section 7(a)(2)8 of the ESA "contains both substantive and
procedural requirements."9 Section 7(a)(2) states that each Federal
agency'0
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce], insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency
action") is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of any endangered species or threatened species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary [of the
Interior or Commerce] . . . to be critical, unless such agency
has been granted an exemption for such action by the
Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section."
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
9 Defenders of Wildife II, 420 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2005).
10 The term "Federal agency" is defined by section 3(7) of the ESA to mean "any
department, agency or instrumentality of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(7).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). Section 7(a)(2) further provides that "each agency shall use the
best scientific and commercial data available" in fulfilling the section's requirements. Id.
31
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Section 7 of the ESA, as originally enacted in 1973, provided in part that "All..
Federal .. . agencies [other than the Departments of Interior and Commerce] shall, in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this [chapter] ... by taking such action necessary to insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be critical." Pub. L. No. 93-205,
87 Stat. 884 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)). Section 7 of the ESA was
amended to its present form in 1979, to change the phrase "do not jeopardize" to "is not
likely to jeopardize," adding the word "adverse" before the phrase "modification of
habitat," and recodifying the provision as section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Pub. L. 96-159, 93
Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979).
The Secretary of Interior's authority and responsibilities under the ESA with
respect to protected terrestrial (land-based and freshwater) species has been delegated to
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), while the Secretary of Commerce's authority and
responsibilities under the ESA with respect to marine species has been delegated to the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). See Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of
1970 and 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).
The exemption under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) to which section 7(a)(2) refers is
issued by the Endangered Species Committee, which was established in 1978 by the
enactment of 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978). Section
7(g) of the ESA specifies the process for applying for such an exemption, and section
7(h) of the ESA specifies the standards the Committee is to apply in deciding whether to
grant an exemption.
Sections 7(g) and (h) focus on practical concerns, not legal constraints
on agency power to protect species. To obtain an exemption, an agency
must show that "there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action," the benefits of the action "clearly outweigh the benefits
of alternative course of action consistent with conserving the species or
its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest," and the
"action has regional or national significance." Thus, at the time
consultation occurs, all parties must operate under the assumption that
all of section 7(a)(2)'s substantive requirements apply to the agency
action. The net effect of the section 7(g) and (h) exemption, then, is to
leave the consultation requirement in effect as it was previously; to
leave in place the kinds of "agency actions" to which the section
7(a)(2) requirement applies; but to provide a set of procedures and
substantive standards for limiting in some circumstances the mandate
that agencies "insure" that their actions are not likely to jeopardize
listed species.
Defenders of Wildhfe II, 420 F.3d at 966 (citations omitted).
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In the 1978 Snail Darter case,12 a majority of the United States
Supreme Court held "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting the [1973
Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction"' 3 and that the original version of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA
that was enacted in 1973, which substantively is essentially the same as
the present version of section 7(a)(2),14 reflects "an explicit congressional
decision to require [federal] agencies to afford first priority to the declared
national policy of saving endangered species."' The majority further
stated in the Snail Darter decision that "[s]ection 7 . .. compels [federal]
agencies not only to consider the effect of their projects on endangered
species, but to take such actions as are necessary to insure that species are
not extirpated as a result of federal activities." 16 The Court also held in the
Snail Darter decision that "[t]he pointed omission of the type of
qualifying language previously included in endangered species legislation
[such as the phrase "insofar as is practicable and consistent with [their]
primary purposes" that was in the 1966 Endangered Species Act 7 ] reveals
a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over
the 'primary missions' of federal agencies."' 8 Consequently, a federal
"agency cannot escape its obligation to comply with the ESA merely
because it is bound to comply with another statute that has consistent,
complementary objectives."' 9
12 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
" Id. at 184.
14 As discussed supra note 11, the 1973 version of section 7(a)(2) required most federal
agencies to ensure that their actions "do not jeopardize" the continued existence of listed
endangered and threatened species and do not result in the modification of designated
critical habitat of such listed species.
" Hill, 437 U.S. at 185. Amendments to section 7 of the ESA that were enacted in 1978,
1979 and 1982 "do not diminish the precedential force" of the Supreme Court's 1978
Snail Darter decision. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987).
" Hill, 437 U.S. at 188 n.34.
" Id. at 175, 181-82 (quoting Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966)).8 Id. at 185. The omission of any qualifying language in section 7(a)(2) of the 1973
Endangered Species Act also was emphasized by the majority in the Snail Darter case.
Id. at 181-83. The specific facts and holding of the majority decision in the Snail Darter
case are discussed infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
1 Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005) (EPA held to be
required to comply with consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA in its
33
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Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA protects listed endangered and
threatened species of fish, wildlife and plants, because the ESA defines
"species" to "include[] any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any
distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife
which interbreeds when mature."20 Section (7)(a)(2), however, only
protects habitats of a species listed as endangered or threatened under the
ESA when the FWS or NMFS has designated that habitat as a "critical
habitat" under the ESA.2 1
ongoing regulation of pesticides registered under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")).
20 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000). The ESA defines "fish or wildlife" to
mean[] any member of the animal kingdom, including without
limitation any mammal, fish, bird (including any migratory,
nonmigratory, or endangered bird for which protection is also afforded
by treaty or other international agreement), amphibian, reptile, mollusk,
crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate, and includes any part,
product, egg, or offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts thereof
Id. § 1532(8).
Section 7(a)(2), however, does not apply either to species that have been
proposed for listing as endangered or threatened under the ESA or to habitat that has been
proposed for designation as critical habitat under the ESA. However, section 7(a)(4) of
the ESA requires federal agencies to confer with the relevant Service on any action which
is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species proposed for listing or result
in the destruction or modification of proposed critical habitat, but does not impose any
substantive requirements or conditions upon such agency actions. 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(4). The Services' regulation governing these conferences is found at 50 C.F.R. §
402.10 (2005).
The ESA makes it unlawful for any "person" (which is defined by the ESA to
include a Federal agent or department as well as a private individual, corporation and
state and local governments and their agents and departments) to "take" any animal that
either is a member of a listed endangered species of fish or wildlife, or that is a member
of a listed threatened species of fish or wildlife. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(13) & (19); 16
U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). The ESA prohibits the removal and
reduction to possession of a plant, or malicious damage or destruction of a plant that is a
member of an endangered and threatened species only either if the plant is growing on
federal land or any other area under Federal jurisdiction or if the removal, cutting,
digging up, damaging or destroying of any such species is "in knowing violation of any
law or regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass
law." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B).
21 The designation of critical habitat under the ESA is governed by §§ 1533(a)(3), (b)(1)
& (b)(2). An area may not be excluded from a species' designated critical habitat if "the
34
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In order for a federal agency action to violate section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA by jeopardizing the continued existence of a species, the agency
action must pose a threat both to the survival of the species and to the
recovery of the species to the point that the species no longer needs to be
listed and protected under the ESA. This conclusion follows from a joint
regulation2 issued by the FWS and the NMFS under section 7 of the ESA
that defines the phrase "jeopardize the continued existence of' to mean "to
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species." 2 3 Under this regulation, a
determination under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA that an action is likely to
jeopardize a species' continued existence is warranted only if both the
survival and recovery of a listed species is threatened; a threat to a species'
recovery alone does not warrant issuance of a "jeopardy" Biological
Opinion.2 4 However, this regulation requires a Biological Opinion's
jeopardy analysis to consider separately "whether an action may
jeopardize a species by appreciably reducing the species' prospects of
recovery as well as survival." 25
An agency action may, however, result in the "adverse
modification" of a species' habitat in violation of section 7(a)(2) of the
failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the
species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). However, in deciding whether to designate a
particular area to be "critical habitat" of a species listed under the ESA, the FWS and
NMFA can take into account the economic impact of specifying the area to be a species'
"critical habitat." Id. As of October 21, 2006, critical habitat had been designated under
the ESA for only 476 of the 1,074 domestic species (476 U.S. animal species and 598
U.S. plant species) listed under the ESA as endangered and threatened. U.S. FWS,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tesspublic/SummaryStatistics.do (last visited October 21, 2006).
22 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.23 Id. This definition has been held to be valid under the ESA by Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 443 n.61 (5th Cir. 2001) and Forest Guardians v.
Veneman, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085-86 (D. Ariz. 2005).24 Forest Guardians, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1086-87.
25 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16345, *56
(D. Ore. 2005). This court reasoned that "[r]ecovery must be considered separately. The
likelihood that recovery and survival will occur is reduced when the likelihood of either
is reduced. In smaller populations, the likelihood of survival is even more dramatically
affected by the likelihood of recovery." Id. at *57.
35
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ESA either by threatening a species' survival or by threatening a species'
recovery by adversely modifying a species' designated critical habitat.26
Although another joint regulation issued by the FWS and NMFS defines
the term "destruction or adverse modification" to mean "a direct or
indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat
for both the survival and recovery of a listed species .. . includ[ing], but. .
. not limited to, alterations adversely modifying any of those physical or
biological features that were the basis for determining the habitat to be
critical," 27 several courts have held that this regulation violates the ESA
because it does not protect critical habitat necessary for a species'
recovery.28 These holdings are based upon the ESA's definitions of
"critical habitat" and "conservation." 29
The ESA defines "critical habitat" to mean "the specific areas
within the geographical area occupied by the species" at the time the
species is listed under the ESA "on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II)
which may require special management considerations or protection; and .
. . specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at
the time it is listed. . . , upon a determination by the [FWS or NMFS] that
such areas are essential for the conservation of the species."3 o The ESA
defines "conservation" to mean "to use and the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to
this chapter are no longer necessary." 31 Consequently, a listed species'
designated critical habitat should include not only those areas that are
necessary for the species' survival, but also those areas that are necessary
for the species' recovery to a point such that the species no longer needs to
be listed as either endangered or threatened under the ESA.32
26 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
27 d
2 Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441-43, 443 n.61; Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2004).
29 Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441-43; GiffordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069-71.
30 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2000).
3 1 d. § 1532(3).
32 GifordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069-70. Section 4(f) of the ESA directs the Services "to
develop and implement recovery plans ... for the conservation and survival" of each
36
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Courts have held that the Services' regulatory definition of
"destruction or adverse modification" violates the ESA by requiring that
an action adversely affect both the survival and recovery of a listed species
in order for an action to be found to violate section 7(a)(2) by adversely
modifying a species' designated critical habitat. 33 The courts' reasoned
that because this regulatory definition eliminates the ESA's recovery goal
from the destruction/adverse modification inquiry, the definition violates
the ESA.34 Based on the courts' holdings, section 7(a)(2) of the ESA
requires federal agencies both "to determine separately whether the
proposed action would destroy or adversely modify critical habitat
necessary for the recovery, as well as the survival, of listed species"35 and
whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of the species by appreciably reducing the likelihood of either the species'
survival or recovery.36
However, by its explicit terms, section 7(a)(2) of the ESA does not
require any protected animal or plant to be killed, injured or otherwise be
the victim of a "taking" in violation of the ESA, although modification
of the habitat of an animal or plant that is a member of an endangered or
threatened species listed under the ESA can be a "taking" in violation of
the ESA only if the habitat modification kills or injures one or more
species listed as endangered and threatened under the ESA, unless a Service "finds that
such a plan will not promote the conservation of the species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1).
" Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441-43, 443 n.61; GiffordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069. The
court in Gifford Pinchot held that designated critical habitat for a listed species must
include both habitat that is necessary to insure the recovery of the species and habitat
necessary for the survival of the species, and that designated critical habitat under the
ESA should not be limited only to the habitat necessary for survival of the species.
GiffordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069.
34 GiffordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069; Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441-43, 443 n.61.
3 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16345, *50
(D. Ore. 2005).
3 6 Id. at *57.
3 The ESA makes it unlawful for any "person" (which includes an agent or department
of the Federal Government) to "take" any animal that is a member of a listed endangered
species of fish or wildlife or that is a member of a listed threatened species of fish or
wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a)
(2005). The ESA defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19).
37
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animals that are members of a species listed under the ESA as either an
endangered or threatened species.
A federal agency's obligation under section 7(a)(2) to "insure" that
any agency action is not likely either to jeopardize a listed species'
existence or to destroy or adversely modify critical habitat of a listed
species requires an a ency to take action to make certain these proscribed
effects do not occur. Under section 7(a)(2), there are
two critical factors triggering this obligation [:] ... (1) that
the "action" be one for which the agency can fairly be
ascribed responsibility, namely, an action "authorized,
funded or carried out" by the agency; and (2) that there is
the requisite nexus to an impact on listed species, namely, a
direct or indirect effect "likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical habitat]."40
Section 7(a)(2) applies to a federal agency "action" only when the
"action" is the type subject to section 7(a)(2)'s terms and the action has
the requisite causal connection to one of the effects proscribed by section
7(a)(2). 4 1 "[A] negative impact on listed species is the likely direct result
38 The FWS and NMFS have issued regulations that define "harm" for purposes of the
ESA's "take" prohibitions to "include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; 50 C.F.R. §
222.102. A prohibited "take" under these regulations can occur as a result of significant
modification or degradation of a protected animal's habitat even if that habitat has not
been designated as "critical habitat" under the ESA, but a "take" can occur under this
regulation only if the significant habitat modification or degradation actually kills or
injures a protected animal. A protected animal may be "injured" within the meaning of
this regulation not only by physical injury to a protected animal, but also by interference
with a protected animal's breeding, feeding or sheltering. These aspects of the "harm"
regulation are analyzed in Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath ofSweet Home Chapter:
Modification of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered
Secies Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. & POL'Y REv. 541 (2003).
3 Defenders of Wildlife ll, 420 F.3d 946, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2005).
4Id, at 962.
4' 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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or indirect effect of an agency's action only if the agency has some control
over that result. Otherwise the requisite nexus is absent."42 "[W]here an
agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory
authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a
legally relevant 'cause' of the effect.'A 3
"By its terms, section 7(a)(2) applies only to 'federal agencies,' not
to state governmental bodies,"4 private business corporations or private
persons. 5 Section 7(a)(2) applies "to federal relationships with private
entities only when the federal agency acts to authorize, fund, or carry out
the relevant activity.""6 Section 7(a)(2) only applies to an action of a state
or local governmental body, private business corporation or private person
that is "authorized" by a federal agency, for example, by means of a
license, permit, or contract,47 or funded by a federal agency.48
A federal agency has an obligation under section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA to act to mitigate harm to a listed species if the FWS or NMFS
"determines that the agency action is 'likely to jeopardize' [a] listed
species or 'adversely modify"' the designated critical habitat of a listed
species.4 9 Unlike section 7(a)(1) 50 of the ESA, which requires each federal
agency to use existing statutory authority to promote conservation5 ' of
42 Defenders of Wildhife II, 420 F.3d at 962.
43 Id. at 963 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004)).
4 Id. at 95 1.
45 Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 979 (7th Cir. 2005)
(consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA held not to be triggered by
actions of a private person not requiring any federal action).
46 Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
47 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998).
48 Id. "[W]hen a wholly private action threatens imminent harm to a listed species the
appropriate safeguard is through section 9, and not section 7. The ESA's citizen suit
provision allows private plaintiffs . . . to enjoin private activities that are reasonably
certain to harm protected species." Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1512 (citations omitted).
49 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 961 n.10 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (2005)).
50 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
si Section 3(3) of the ESA defines "conservation" to mean
To use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary
to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to,
all activities associated with scientific resources management such as
39
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listed species, section 7(a)(2) of the ESA imposes on each federal agency
"an additional, do-no-harm obligation-- and reciprocal authority--
applicable when the agency's own actions could cause harm to endangered
[or threatened] species."5 2 "[T]he authority conferred on [federal] agencies
[by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA] to protect listed species goes beyond that
conferred by agencies' own governing statutes." 53 A federal agency's
obligation under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to protect the existence of
listed species and the critical habitat of listed species is not limited only to
those actions that are practicable and consistent with the agency's primary
purpose.54 "The 'pointed omission' of such qualifications amount[s] to an
'explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority
to the declared national policy of saving endangered species."'ss
Federal courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's Snail Darter
decision to mean that when there is a substantive violation of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA a court should issue an injunction without the court
engaging in a traditional balancing of the equities.5 6 The Supreme Court in
Snail Darter enjoined operation of the Tellico Dam, which the Court
found would violate the substantive requirements of section 7(a)(2), even
though construction of the dam had almost been completed, regardless of
the cost and without otherwise balancing equities.5 7 The Court held that
"Congress has spoken in the plainest of words [in section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA], making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor
of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting
a policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution."' 58 Courts have
interpreted Snail Darter as modifying the traditional standard for issuing a
research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance,
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the
extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
52 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 965.
s3 Id. at 964.
54 Id. at 964-65 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 181, 181 n.26 (1978)).
ss Id. at 965 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 185).
56 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1987).
s7 Hill, 437 U.S. at 172-73.
5Id. at 194.
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permanent injunction when the substantive requirements of section 7(a)(2)
of the ESA are violated.59
Generally, in order to be entitled to a permanent injunction,
a plaintiff must show: (1) success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the
threatened injury to the plaintiff will outweigh any
threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant; and
(4) granting the permanent injunction will not disserve the
public interest. However, in cases involving the ESA, the
standard is different. Specifically, the third and fourth
prongs of the injunction analysis have been foreclosed by
Congress.60
Federal courts also have held that "absent 'unusual circumstances"' an
injunction is the appropriate remedy for a substantial procedural violation
of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.
Although neither section 7(a)(2) nor any other provision of the
ESA defines the term "action" for purposes of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA,
a regulation adopted by the FWS and NMFS defines "action" to mean "all
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high
seas," 62 and offers as examples:
(a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat;
(b) the promulgation of regulations;
s9 Fla. Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284-89 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
60 Id. at 1284 (citations omitted). This court noted that several courts "have concluded
that violations of the ESA are per se irreparable [harn]," and that "[p]resuming
irreparable harm is also consistent with the language and intent of the ESA." Id. at 1287
n.6. The court also held that "jeopardizing the existence of an endangered or threatened
species through destruction of suitable habitat clearly constitutes irreparable harm." Id. at
1287 (citation omitted).
61 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985). The proper remedy for a
violation of a procedural requirement of section 7(a)(2) is discussed in more detail infra
in Part III(E) of this article.
6' 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
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(c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-
way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or
(d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land,
water, or air.6 3
However, section 7(a)(2) and its consultation requirements apply only to
affirmative agency action; section 7(a)(2) does not apply to agency
inaction or failure to act. 6
Another regulation issued by the Services provides that "[s]ection
7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control." 65 This regulation does not
63 Id The Forest Service's review of a private mining entity's Notice of Intent ("NOI") to
conduct prospecting and mining operations using suction dredging in streams and rivers
on national forest lands that might cause disturbance of surface resources, under rights
granted by the General Mining Law of 1872, and the Forest Service's determination that
the prospecting and mining operations that are the subject of the NOI are not likely to
cause a significant disturbance of surface resources, have been held not to be an agency
"action" "authorizing" these private mining activities within the meaning of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA, because in such a situation the Forest Service does not "authorize" or
"permit" the private mining activities that are the subject of the NOI. Karuk Tribe v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1100-02 (N.D. Cal. 2005). This holding was based
upon "the fact that, pursuant to the General Mining Law and 36 C.F.R. § 228, the Forest
Service may not interfere with mining that is not likely to result in a significant
disturbance of surface resources." Id. at 1093-94. However, the Forest Service's review
and approval of a private mining entity's proposed plan of operations, for mining
activities under the General Mining Law of 1872 that were the subject of an NOI and that
a Forest Service District Ranger has determined will likely cause significant disturbance
of surface resources, may be an agency "action" authorizing these private mining
activities that is subject to section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Id. at 1102 (dictum).
6 See W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27,092 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Bureau of Land Management's failure to regulate certain vested rights-of-way held by
private landowners to divert water for irrigation purposes held not to constitute agency
"action" subject to section 7(a)(2)'s consultation requirements).
65 50 C.F.R. § 402.03. This regulation and the other Endangered Species Act regulations
in chapter 4 of title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations were jointly adopted by the
FWS, Department of the Interior, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the Department of Commerce. Defenders of Wildhife II, 420 F.3d
946, 951 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).
Jan Hasselman argues that this regulation violates section 7(a)(2) of the ESA
because "Congress intended [section] 7 to apply uniformly to any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by a federal agency, not just so-called 'discretionary' ones." Jan
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define "discretionary" and does not provide any guidance as to how the
term should be interpreted for purposes of this regulation. This regulation
and court decisions defining this term and applying it to varying factual
situations are analyzed infra in Part IV.
For purposes of section 7(a)(2), an agency action may include
programmatic agency standards and agency programs that govern a
number of individual agency actions that are part of an agency's
administration or management of standards or a program in large
geographical areas under the agency's jurisdiction. 66 Significant examples
of such agency actions include a BLM multi-year strategy for logging of
timber on federal lands under its jurisdiction in several states that
establishes total annual allowable timber harvests, but does not designate
Hasselman, Holes in the Endangered Species Act Safety Net: The Role ofAgency
"Discretion" in Section 7 Consultation, 25 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 125, 127 (2006).
However, because 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 "was promulgated in 1986,... a [facial] challenge
[to this regulation as inconsistent with the text of the Endangered Species Act] would
appear untimely [today] under the general six-year statute of limitations applicable to
suits against the United States. [T]he appropriate way to challenge [such] a long-standing
regulation as violative of [the ESA] is to file a petition for amendment or rescission and
then challenge the denial of that petition." Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp.
2d 53, 67 n.11 (D.D.C. 2003) (citations omitted).
66 E.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(FEMA's implementation of the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") held to be a
federal agency action subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA); Fla. Key
Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (FEMA required to consult with
FWS under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA with regard to FEMA's implementation and
management of the NFIP in Monroe County, Florida, by issuing flood insurance in the
county, and the effect of the Program on the continued existence of the endangered
Florida key deer where the remaining habitat of this deer is located, as a result of
facilitating and encouraging new development in undeveloped areas of the county),
motion for permanent injunction granted, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Brownlee, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2005) (Corps of Engineers
held to be required to comply with the consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA for the Corps' issuance of General Nationwide Permits ("NWPs") under section 404
of the Clean Water Act, with consultation focusing upon the cumulative impacts of the
NWPs program as a whole); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1256 (D. Mont. 2005) (Forest Service's authorization,
funding and use of chemical fire retardants to fight fires in national forests held to be
federal agency "action" subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
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any particular areas where timber harvest will occur,67 and Forest Service
multi-year Long Range Management Plans ("LRMPs") for particular
national forests.68 In addition, each individual agency action, such as an
individual timber sale on a particular parcel of land, must comply with the
requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.69
In Snail Darter, the Supreme Court held that the 1973 version of
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA7 0 applied to Federal agency projects for which
construction began prior to the enactment of the ESA in 1973.71
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the ESA would be violated by
closing the gates of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River and by
operation of the dam because the impoundment of water in the reservoir
and the dam's operation would destroy designated critical habitat of the
snail darter fish (a species listed as endangered species under the ESA)
and would jeopardize the continued existence of the only known
population of the snail darter species. 72 The Court reached this holding
even though the construction of the dam began in 1967 before the
enactment of the ESA in 1973 and the dam's construction was
approximately 70% to 80% complete at the time that the snail darter was
listed as an endangered species under the ESA. The Court concluded that
67See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992).
68Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994). The Pacific
Rivers Council decision also held, as discussed infra notes 97-104 and accompanying
text, that an LMRP is an ongoing continuing agency action throughout its duration that
remains subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA for the duration of the
LRMP.69 Lane County Audubon Soc 'y, 958 F.2d at 293.
70 The 1973 version of section 7(a)(2), which is discussed supra note 11, was in
substance essentially the same as the present version of section 7(a)(2), except that the
1973 version required federal agencies to insure that their actions "do not jeopardize"
protected listed species or modify their designated critical habitat, while the present
version of section 7(a)(2) requires Federal agencies to insure that any agency action "is
not likely to jeopardize" a protected listed species or adversely modify their designated
critical habitat.
7 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). At the time of this decision, the FWS
and NNFA had not yet issued the regulations under 50 C.F.R. Part 402 that define
"action" and other terms under section 7 of the ESA and limit section 7 of the ESA to
"discretionary" federal agency action.
72 Hill, 437 U.S. at 165-66, 171-72.
7 Id. at 165.
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the 1973 version of section 7(a)(2) "admits of no exception," 74 and that its
"plain language" applied to the Tellico Dam project even though it was
"well underway" when the ESA was enacted in 1973. The Court based
this latter conclusion upon its finding that "[i]t has not been shown ...
how TVA can close the gates of the Tellico Dam without 'carrying out' an
action that has been 'authorized' and 'funded' by a federal agency [] [n]or
. . . how such action will 'insure' that the snail darter's habitat is not
disrupted . . . and will [not] have . . . the opposite effect, namely the
eradication of an endangered species."75 The majority rejected Justice
Powell's argument that section 7 was limited to future prospective "actions
that [a federal] agency is deciding whether to authorize, to fund or to carry
out," concluding that section 7 was not limited only to prospective federal
agency actions or to projects in the planning stage,76 and noting that "it is
clear Congress foresaw that § 7 would, on occasion, require agencies to
alter ongoing projects in order to fulfill the goals of the Act."77 In rejecting
Justice Powell's argument that the majority was retroactively applying the
Endangered Species Act, the majority stated its holding
74 Id. at 173.
7 1 Id. at 173-74. Although the Endangered Species Act of 1973 contained some
"hardship exemptions" from some of its provisions, none of them "would even remotely
apply to the Tellico [Dam]." Id. at 188. After the Supreme Court's Snail Darter
decision, Congress in 1978 enacted the provisions in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e) and (h) that
created an Endangered Species Committee that in certain circumstances can grant a
federal agency an exemption from section 7(a)(2)'s requirements. This exemption is
discussed supra note 11.
76 Id. at 173 n.18.
7 Id. at 186. The majority specifically referred to Congressman's Dingell's reference to
Air Force practice bombing, which the majority stated "obviously pinpoints a particular
activity - intimately related to the national defense - which a major federal department
would be obliged to alter in deference to the strictures of § 7." Id. at 186-87. The
majority also discussed the House Committee's report reference to section 7 requiring the
Director of the National Park Service "to conform the practices of his agency to the need
for protecting the rapidly dwindling stock of grizzly bears within Yellowstone Park. . . at
least .. .by supplying them with carcasses from excess elk within the park, by curtailing
the destruction ofhabitat by clearcutting National Forests surrounding the Park, and by
preventing hunting until their numbers have recovered sufficiently to withstand these
pressures." Id. at 187 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 14 (1973)).
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[m]erely gives effect to the plain words of the statute,
namely, that § 7 affects all projects which remain to be
authorized, funded, or carried out. Indeed, under the Act
there could be no "retroactive" application since, by
definition, any prior action of a federal agency which
would have come under the scope of the Act must have
already resulted in the destruction of an endangered species
or its critical habitat. In that circumstance the species would
have already been extirpated or its habitat destroyed; the
Act would then have no subject matter to which it might
apply.78
The Supreme Court concluded that its interpretation was mandated
by Congress' intention that "endangered species . . . be afforded the
highest of priorities" even though "this view of the Act will produce
results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and
of many millions of dollars in public funds."7 9
The Court also found that Congress' continued appropriations for
construction of the Tellico Dam after the enactment of the ESA in 1973
did not implicitly repeal or amend the substantive requirements of the
1973 version of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA as applied to the Tellico
Dam.8 0 The majority based this holding in part upon the doctrine that
repealing legislation by implication particularly implicit repeals by
appropriation measures) is disfavored,8 and the rules of Congress that
8 Id. at 187 n.32.
9 Id. at 174.
8 Id. at 189-193. The Endangered Species Committee, created in 1978 when Congress
enacted amendments to the ESA in response to the Supreme Court's Snail Darter
decision, denied an exemption under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e) and (h), to the Tellico Dam,
but "Congress then passed a bill mandating completion of the dam." Daniel A. Farber,
Jody Freeman, Ann E. Carlson, and Roger W. Findley, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 209 n.1 (7th ed. 2006). However, the operation of the Tellico
Dam did not result in the extinction of the snail darter species because some members of
the species successfully were transplanted to two other locations and small populations of
the species also have been found in several locations downstream from the Tellico Dam.
Zymunt J.B. Plater et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND
SocIETY 802 (3d ed. 2004).
8 Hill, 437 U.S. at 189-91.
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prohibit a propriation measures from amending existing substantive
legislation. The majority refused to establish "an exception to the rule
against implied repealers in a circumstance where, as here, Appropriations
Committees have expressly stated their 'understanding' that the earlier
legislation [the ESA] would not prohibit the proposed expenditure [for the
completion of the Tellico Dam]." 3 The majority "would . . . be unable to
find that in this case" that the ESA and the later appropriations for the
Tellico Dam are irreconcilable, because "here it is entirely possible 'to
regard each as effective' because the 1977 appropriations for the Tellico
Dam occurred after "TVA confidently reported to the Appropriations
Committees that efforts to transplant the snail darter appeared to be
successful; this surely gave those Committees some basis for the
impression that there was no direct conflict between the Tellico Project
and the Endangered Species Act." 84
If Snail Darter had interpreted section 7(a)(2) as either modifying
or overriding any contradictory directives to a federal agency in another
statute, such as the agency's enabling legislation or appropriation
82 Id. at 190-91. The majority also declined to find an implicit repeal of the ESA as
applied to the Tellico Dam from statements by the Appropriations Committees in charge
of appropriations for the Tellico Dam, because the committees had no jurisdiction over
the subject of endangered species. Congress as a whole was not aware that the
committees had accepted the position of the TVA that the ESA did not prevent the
completion and operation of the Tellico Dam and that the TVA had reported to the
Appropriations Committees that operation of the Tellico Dam would not violate section 7
of the ESA because the snail darter population had been successfully transplanted to
another location, when the TVA had not in fact convinced the Department of Interior that
transplantation of the snail darter population to another location would be successful. Id.
at 191-93. See id. at 162-63.
83 Id. at 191. The majority reasoned that
Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations
cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress, particularly not in
the circumstances presented by this case. First, the Appropriations
Committees had no jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species.
Second, there is no indication that Congress as a whole was aware of
TVA's position [that the continuing appropriations for Tellico Dam
constituted an implied repeal of the 1973 {ESA}, at least insofar as it
applied to the Tellico Dam], although the Appropriations Committees
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legislation, that directs the agency to undertake a specified action such as
construction or operation of a facility, the majority would have simply
held that the requirements of section 7(a)(2) apply to any action a federal
agency carries out, authorizes or funds under another statute, regardless of
whether the other statute mandated that the agency perform the action in
conformity with section 7(a)(2). This part of the opinion, addressing the
issue of whether appropriations for the Tellico Dam after the enactment of
section 7 amended or partially repealed that section of the ESA, suggests
that section 7(a)(2) does not apply to an agency action that is mandated
under another statute when compliance with section 7(a)(2)'s requirements
would present an "irreconcilable conflict" with an agency's mandate under
another statute to perform a ministerial duty when specified criteria or
conditions are present, without taking action to protect species listed under
the ESA."s
Consistent with the Snail Darter majority's statement that "§ 7
would, on occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order to
fulfill the goals of the Act,"86 the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") has
been held subject to the requirements of the ESA in allocations and
diversions of water from a dam owned and managed by the BOR, where
BOR "controls the dam" and "the United States retains overall authority
over decisions on use of [the dam's] water,"87 even though the dam was
constructed and began to operate well before the enactment of the ESA.
This holding was based upon the fact that the BOR "retains authority to
manage the Dam and . . . remains the owner in fee simple of the Dam."89
BOR has "responsibilities under the ESA as a federal agency ... [and] the
authority to direct Dam operations to comply with the ESA"90 "that
85 The inapplicability of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to an action that another statute
mandates an agency to undertake is discussed infra notes 194-299 and accompanying
text.
" Hill, 437 U.S. at 186. Several examples of such situations noted by the Snail Darter
majority are noted supra note 77.
87 Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
1999). In 1905 the United States had appropriated all available waters rights in the river
on which the dam was located, although the court did not reference this fact in support of
its holdings in the case. Id. at 1209.
" Id. at 1213.89 id.
90 Id
48
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT & SECTION 7(a) (2)
override the water rights"9' of irrigators (who are not third party contract
beneficiaries of the contract between BOR and a power company that
operates and maintains the dam under the contract).92 The court stated that
even though the "ESA was passed well after the agreement, the legislation
still applies as long as the federal agency retains some measure of control
over the activity. Therefore, when an agency, such as [BOR], decide[d] to
take action, the ESA generally applies to the contract." 93 It is worth
noting, however, that the allocation and diversion of water by a federal
agency from a federally-owned dam under provisions of a contract in
some cases may not be subject to the requirements of section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act if the contract was executed prior to the
enactment of the Act and does not contain a provision authorizing the
federal government to modify allocations and diversions of water under
the contract to comply with subsequently enacted federal legislation. 94
A federal agency's ongoing regulatory supervision of the actions
and operations of a licensee or permittee can be "agency action" subject to
the requirements of section 7(a)(2), including the consultation
requirement, when the federal agency has continuing authority to require
the permittee or licensee to act to prevent the types of harm to ESA-listed
species that are proscribed by section 7(a)(2). 95 Other continuing, ongoing
9' Id.
92 Id. at 1210-12.
9 Id. at 1213 (citations omitted).
94 This issue is discussed infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
9 Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005) (EPA's ongoing, continuing
regulatory authority over pesticides registered by EPA under FIFRA, held subject to the
consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA because EPA retains discretion
under FIFRA to alter the registration of pesticides to protect ESA-listed species);
Waterwatch v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 2000 WL 1100059, *9 (D. Ore. 2000) (Corps
of Engineers retained ongoing, discretionary involvement or control within meaning of
50 C.F.R. § 402.03 over water diversions by privately-operated water pumps to protect
fish and wildlife, under permits issued to a private corporation in 1971 and 1978 under
the Rivers and Harbors Act, authorizing construction of the pumps and regulating the
ongoing operation of these pump stations in federal navigable waters); Sierra Club v.
U.S. Dep't of Energy, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1189 (D. Colo. 2002) (Department of
Energy's discretionary control over construction and operation of a road easement on
federal lands for 99 years and over mining activities to which the road connects held to be
continuing agency action that is subject to the consultation requirements of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA). Although recognizing this principle, W. Watersheds Project v.
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actions of a federal agency have been held subject to the requirements of
section 7(a)(2) when the agency while performing the actions has
authority to protect ESA-listed species from the types of harm proscribed
by section 7(a) of the ESA. 96 Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, relying
upon the Snail Darter's holding that section 7 of the ESA "may require
agencies to alter ongoing projects."9 7 held that the Forest Service's Land
and Resource Management Plans ("LRMP") 98 for particular national
Matejko held that the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") did not engage in ongoing
agency action that was subject to section 7(a)(2) of the ESA when BLM failed to regulate
certain vested rights-of-way held by private landowners to divert water for irrigation
purposes, when BLM only has authority to regulate these rights-of-way if a user
substantially deviates from the location or authorized use of a vested use, because BLM
retains no power under the rights-of-way to inure to the benefit of species protected under
the ESA. W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 2006 U.S. App. LEXis 27092 (9th Cir.
2006).
96 Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 1994); Nat. Wildlife
Fed'n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168-74 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (FEMA's actions in
implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the NFIP through the minimum eligibility
criteria, the mapping of flood plains, and the Community Rating system, held to be
continuing agency action subject to the consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA because FEMA has discretion in administering these parts of the NFIP to protect
ESA-listed species from the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
97 Pac. Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1055 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 186 (1978)).
98 Land and Resource Management Plans "are important programmatic documents that
set out guidelines for resource management" in particular national forests. Id. at 1051.
"The LRM~s are comprehensive management plans governing a multitude of individual
projects. Indeed, every individual project planned in ... national forests .. . is
implemented according to the LRMPs." Id. at 1053.
These LRMPs establish forest-wide and area-specific standards and
guidelines to which all projects must adhere for up to 15 years. The
LRMPs identify lands suitable for timber production and other uses,
and establish an allowable sale quantity of timber and production
targets and schedules for forage, road construction, and other economic
commodities. The LRMPs also seek to provide adequate fish and
wildlife habitat to maintain viable populations of existing native
species, and "include measures for preventing the destruction or
adverse modification of critical habitat for threatened and endangered
species." Every resource plan, permit, contract, or any other document
pertaining to the use of the forest must be consistent with the LRMP.
Id. at 1052 (citations omitted).
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forests constitute continuing agency action throughout their duration. 99
Furthermore, Pacific Rivers Council held that when a new species is listed
as endangered or threatened after the adoption of an LRMP, the Forest
Service is required to reinitiate consultation under section 7(a)(2) for the
entire LRMP and for ongoing and new timber sales, range activities and
road building projects in a national forest pursuant to an LRMP 00
"because the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after
adoption." 01 Consequently, Pacific Rivers Council held that the Forest
Service may be required to reinitiate consultation under section 7(a)(2) for
an entire LRMP and for ongoing and new timber sales, range activities
and road building projects in a particular national forest under an LRMP
for a species that was listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA
after the LRMP was adopted.102
As discussed in Part III of this article, section 7(a)(2) ESA has
procedural requirements that are designed to ensure federal agency
compliance with section 7(a)(2)'s substantive requirements. 03 "The
ESA's procedural requirements call for a systematic determination of the
effects of a federal project [or other action] on endangered [and
threatened] species. If a project [or other action] is allowed to proceed
without substantial compliance with those procedural requirements, there
can be no assurance that a violation of the ESA's substantive provisions
will not result. The latter, of course, is impermissible."'
04
99Id. at 1053-56.
' Id. at 1051-52, 1056 n.12.
101 Id. at 1053. The court in this case rejected the Forest Service's arguments that LRMPs
"are agency actions only at the time they are adopted, revised, or amended," and that
"only the specific activities authorized by the LRMPs are agency actions within the
meaning of the ESA" by stating "that forest management plans can be actions even after
their implementation." Id. at 1055.
102 Id. at 1056.
103 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
104 Id. at 764.
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III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
Section 7 ESA has a number of procedural requirements with
which a federal agency must comply, which seek to prevent substantive
violations of section 7(a)(2). These procedural requirements include, in the
sequential order in which they occur for a particular federal agency
"action," an inquiry, a biological assessment, consultation, and a
biological opinion.
Section 7(a)(2) makes no legal distinction between the
trigger for its requirement that agencies consult with FWS
and the trigger for its requirement that agencies shape their
actions so as not to jeopardize endangered [and threatened]
species.... An agency's obligation to consult is ... in aid
of its obligation to shape its own actions so as not to
jeopardize listed species, not independent of it. Both the
consultation obligation and the obligation to "insure"
against jeopardizing listed species are triggered by "any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency,"
and both apply if such an "action" is under consideration. 05
A. Inquiry and Biological Assessment
A federal agency proposing to take an "action" subject to section
7(a)(2) of the ESA first may be required to inquire of the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) whether any
members of any species listed under the ESA as threatened or endangered
"may be present" in the area of the proposed action. Section 7(c)(1)
requires each federal agency, "with respect to any [proposed] . . . action of
such agency for which no contract for construction has been entered into
and for which no construction has begun on November 10, 1978," to
request the FWS and NMFS to provide the requesting agency with
information as to "whether any species which is listed, or proposed to be
"os Defenders of Wildife II, 420 F.3d 946, 961 (9th Cir. 2005).
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listed, [as endangered or threatened under the ESA] may be present in the
area of such proposed action."1
06
If the FWS or NMFS, on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available, advises the requesting agency that members of
any species listed as threatened or endangered may be present in the action
area or that any designated critical habitat of an ESA-listed species may be
present in the action area, 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b) requires the action
agency to prepare a biological assessment for the action if it is a "major
construction activity" when the contract had not been entered into and
construction had not begun prior to November 10, 1978.107 A biological
assessment is required to "evaluate the potential effects of the action on
listed and proposed species and designated and proposed critical habitat
and determine whether any such species or habitat are likely to be
adversely affected by the action . . ." 108
106 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000).
107 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b) (2005). "Major construction activity" is defined as "a
construction project (or other undertaking having similar physical impacts) which is a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" as
referred to in [section 102(2)(C) of] the National Environmental Policy Act." Id.
10s 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a). A biological assessment may be part of an environmental
impact statement or environmental assessment under NEPA. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763.
Section 7(c)(1) of the ESA further provides that
Such assessment shall be completed within 180 days after the date on
which initiated (or within such other period as mutually agreed to by
the Secretary and such agency, except that if a permit or license
applicant is involved, the 180-day period may not be extended unless
such agency provides the applicant, before the close of such period,
with a written statement setting forth the estimated length of the
proposed extension and the reasons therefor) and, before any contract
for construction is entered into and before construction is begun with
respect to such action.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). "Any person who may wish to apply for an exemption under [16
U.S.C. § 1536(g)] for that action may conduct a biological assessment to identify any
endangered or threatened species which is likely to be affected by such action," but
"[a]ny such biological assessment must ... be conducted in cooperation with the [FWS
or NMFS] and under the supervision of the appropriate Federal agency." Id. §
1536(c)(2).
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B. Consultation
If a federal agency determines, on the basis of a biological
assessment or otherwise, that a proposed action of the agency "may affect"
a species listed under the ESA as endangered or threatened or designated
critical habitat of an ESA-listed species, the agency [referred to as the
Federal action agency] must formally consult with the relevant service,
FWS or NMFS, to obtain the Service's opinion as to how the proposed
agency action will affect the species or its critical habitat.' 09 Although the
'0 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Formal consultations are governed by Services regulations at
50 C.F.R. § 402.14. Pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 402.04, the Services have adopted
counterpart regulations for Fire Plan Projects under the National Fire Plan, and for EPA
actions in regulating pesticides under the FIFRA. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.40-.48. Portions of
the FIFRA counterpart regulations have been invalidated on the grounds that they fail to
comply with the consultation and "is not likely to jeopardize" requirements of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA. Wash. Toxics Coal. v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, No. C04-1998C, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIs 60138, *53, *79, *84, *92, *94-95, *102-103 (W.D. Wash. 2006). The
Services' promulgation of the FIFRA counterpart regulations also has been held to be an
"agency action" that is subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Id at
*58. These counterpart regulations supercede the Services' consultation procedures in 50
C.F.R. § 402.14. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04. A Services' regulation also provides for
"expedited consultation in emergency situations." See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp.
581, 623 (D. Mass. 1995), afdper curiam, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998) (designated as
not for publication); 50 C.F. R. § 402.05. The Services' regulation also provides:
Reinitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be requested by
the Federal agency or by the Service, where discretionary Federal
involvement or control over the action has been retained or is
authorized by law and:
(a) If the amount or extent of taking specified in the incidental take
statement is exceeded;
(b) If new information reveals effects of the action that may affect
listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not
previously considered;
(c) If the identified action is subsequently modified in a manner that
causes an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that was not
considered in the biological opinion; or
(d) If a new species is listed or critical habitat designated that may be
effected by the identified action.
50 C.F.R. § 402.16.
Reinitiation of the consultation that occurred when the FWS issued an Incidental
Take Permit under section 10 of the ESA, authorizing specified incidental takes of
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FWS or NMFS will, in an appropriate situation, request the federal action
agency to engage in consultation with it under section 7(a)(2), the FWS
and NMFS "lack[] the authority to require the initiation of consultation.
The determination of possible effects is the Federal action agency's
responsibility." 0 "Any possible effect, whether beneficial, benign,
adverse, or of an undetermined character, triggers the formal consultation
requirement."I '
A 'may affect' determination does not provide statutory
authority to regulate ... private activity. To the contrary, a
'may affect' finding is only a preliminary step in a
procedural process that is designed to identify federal
actions that in fact are likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of a protected species [or adversely modify
designated critical habitat of a protected species], and to
offer reasonable and prudent alternatives to a federal
activity that is determined to violate section 7[(a)(2)]'s
substantive prohibition ... 1 12
However, no formal consultation is required if, either as a result of
the preparation of a biological assessment or informal consultation with
the relevant Service under 50 C.F.R. § 402.13,113 the action agency
members of a particular listed species, is not required when a new species that was listed
subsequent to the issuance of the ITP may be affected by the permittee's activities
authorized by the ITP, when the ITP does not authorize the FWS to amend the ITP to
require the permittee to undertake additional measures to protect a newly listed species.
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001).
Reinitiation of consultation requires the relevant Service to issue a new Biological
Opinion before the agency may continue with its action. Id. at 1076.
110 Defenders of Wildlife v. Flowers, 414 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2005).
... Nat. Wildlife Fed'n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,949 (June 3, 1986)).
112 Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
113 Informal consultation under this section "is an optional process that includes all
discussions, correspondence, etc., between the Service and the Federal agency or the
designated non-Federal representative, designed to assist the Federal agency in
determining whether formal consultation or a conference is required." 50 C.F.R. §
402.13(a).
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determines, with the written concurrence of the relevant Service, that the
proposed agency action "is not likely to adversely affect" a protected
listed species or its designated critical habitat."14 Such formal consultation
therefore is excused only when "(1) an action agency determines that its
action is unlikely to . . . affect the protected species or critical habitat and
(2) the relevant Service (FWS or NMFS) concurs with that
determination."" 5
If no such concurrence is reached between the agency and the
relevant Service, the agency must undertake formal consultation with the
relevant Service if the agency determines that its action may affect a listed
species or designated critical habitat of a listed species." 6 An agency
cannot avoid its duty to consult under section 7(a)(2) simply by
determining on its own, without performing a biological assessment, that
its action in question will have no effect on any endangered or threatened
species.117 However, if an agency concludes from its studies that the risk
of harm to a listed species or critical habitat from an agency action is
"remote, and indeed, the calculated risk is infinitesimal," it is not arbitrary
and capricious for the agency to conclude, without performing a biological
assessment, that it is not required to consult about the agency action with
one of the Services under section 7(a)(2)." 8
Section 7(d) of the ESA provides that after the initiation of
required consultation under section 7(a)(2), the federal agency and the
permit or license applicant (if any) "shall not make any irreversible or
114 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b). "A finding of 'not likely to adversely affect' can be made only
if the effects of the proposed action on the listed species are expected to be 'discountable,
or insignificant, or completely beneficial."' Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 345 F. Supp. 2d at
1168 n.16.
11s Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
omitted). Houston held that a federal agency was not excused from the duty to consult
under section 7 of the ESA because the NMFS had informed the agency that formal
consultation was not necessary, when the NMFA refused to concur with the agency's
opinion that listed species would not be adversely affected by the agency's action. Id. at
1127. The court in Houston held that in such a situation a federal agency "had a clear
lepal obligation to at least request a formal consultation." Id.
' 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13(a), 402.14(a).
"
7 Nat'l Wildife Fed'n, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
118 Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082,
1092 (9th Cir. 2004).
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irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency action
which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of
any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate
section [7(a)(2)]." 1l 9 The ESA also prohibits a federal agency from
making any "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources"
before it initiates formal consultation.120 Section 7(d)'s restriction
"continues until [an] agency conforms its [action] to the requirements of
section 7(a)(2)" of the ESA.121
Section 7(d) does not amend section 7(a) to read that a
comprehensive biological opinion is not required before the
initiation of agency action so long as there is no irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources. Rather, section
7(d) clarifies the requirements of section 7(a), ensuring that
the status quo will be maintained during the consultation
process. Section 7(d) is not an independent authonization
for "incremental-step" consultation.12
As a result, a court may order the rescission of contracts entered into by a
federal agency in violation of section 7(d) of the ESA prior to completing
the formal consultation process.123
C. Biological Opinion
After the formal consultation is completed, section 7(b)124 requires
the relevant Service (FWS or NMFS) to issue a Biological Opinion
evaluating the nature and extent of the effects of the proposed action of the
119 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2000). "This provision does not apply to the conference
requirement for proposed species or proposed critical habitat under section 7(a)(4) of the
Act." 50 C.F.R. § 402.09.
120 Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128 n.6.
121 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987).
122 Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455 n.34 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
123 Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128.
124 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).
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federal agency and the cumulative effects' 25 the action will have on listed
endangered or threatened species protected by the ESA and on critical
habitat of such species, and to provide the relevant "Service's opinion on
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat."l26 A Biological Opinions requires evaluation of the "effects of
the action" that are "the direct and indirect effects of an action on the
species or critical habitat, together with the effects of other activities that
are interrelated or interdependent with that action, that will be added to the
environmental baseline."l27
"Indirect effects" are defined by the Services' regulations as "those
that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are
reasonably certain to occur."l 28 Consequently, a Biological Opinion
"should address both the jeopardy and critical habitat prongs of Section
7[(a)(2)] by considering the current status of the species, the
environmental baseline, the effects of the proposed action, and the
cumulative effects of the proposed action."l29 "[B]ecause the ESA requires
the biological opinion to analyze the effect of the entire agency action,",3 0
a Biological Opinion for an oil and gas lease for federal public lands must
125 A Services regulation defines "cumulative effects" as "those effects of future State or
private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur
within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
"Action area" is defined to mean "all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the
Federal action and not merely the immediate area involved in the action." Id.
126 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h).1271 d. § 402.02. "Interrelated actions" are "those that are part of a larger action and
depend on the larger action for their justification" and "interdependent actions" are "those
that have no independent utility apart from the action under consideration." Id.
The environmental baseline includes the past and present impacts of all
Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the
action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in
the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7
consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are
contemporaneous with the consultation in process.
Id.
128 id
12 9 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th
Cir. 2004).
130 Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted).
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comprehensively analyze the impact of post-leasing activities (exploration,
production and development) when Congress has not statutorily
segmented each of these activities into separate stages, even though there
will be Biological Opinions for each of these subsequent post-leasing
activities before they are authorized by the federal agency selling the
lease.' 31
If the Biological Opinion concludes the proposed action is likely to
violate section 7(a)(2), which can occur if the action either is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of a proposed species or destroy or
adversely modify designated critical habitat of such a protected species by
threatening critical habitat that is necessary either for a species' survival or
a species' recovery,132 the requesting agency either must modify its
proposal so that a substantive violation of section 7(a)(2) will not occur or
obtain a section 7(h) exemption from section 7(a)(2).' 3 3 If the relevant
Service issuing the Biological Opinion finds that such jeopardy or critical
habitat destruction or adverse modification will occur, the relevant Service
is required to suggest to the requesting Federal agency "those reasonable
and prudent alternatives" which the Service believes the federal agency or
131 Id. at 1453, 1454-58; North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 609 (D.C. Cir.
1980) ("agency action" for an oil and gas lease sale under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq., is "the lease sale and all subsequent
activities, but satisfaction of the ESA mandate that no endangered [species] life be
jeopardized must be measured in view of the full contingent of OCSLA checks and
balances and all mitigating measures adopted in pursuance thereof."). The lack of
knowledge as to the precise location and extent of future oil and gas exploration,
production and development activities within the leased lands does not excuse an
agency's failure to prepare such a comprehensive biological opinion, which should
identify particular areas where oil and gas activities would be incompatible with the
continued existence and conservation of protected species. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1454.
One court has held, however, that because Congress, under OCSLA, has
statutorily segmented the oil and gas activities under an OCSLA into three stages (lease
sales, exploration, and development and production), the Biological Opinions for the
lease stage can be limited to the effects of just the lease and exploration stages of an
OCSLA lease. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609-12 (9th Cir. 1984).
1' Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 U.S. Dist. LExis 16,345,
*57 (D. Ore. 2005).
1I Id. at *36.
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permit or license applicant can take and which would not violate section
7(a)(2).I314
Although the relevant Service cannot veto a proposed agency
action that it believes will violate section 7(a)(2),' 3 5 a Biological Opinion
"typically [has] a 'virtually determinative effect' on the ultimate agency
action"l 36 and "'in reality ... has a powerful coercive effect on the action
agency' with the potential to 'alter[] the legal regime to which the agency
action is subject."" 37
A Biological Opinion often is accompanied by an Incidental Take
Statement issued under section 7(b)(4). 138
D. Incidental Take Statement
Under section 7(b)(4), the relevant Service is required to issue to
the requesting federal agency and the permit or license applicant, if any,
an Incidental Take Statement that will make any take of a protected
species, that is incidental to the agency action and that is in compliance
with the terms and conditions specified in the written statement, lawful
under the ESA.139 An Incidental Taking Statement must be issued if the
relevant Service determines:
134 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000).
"' Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987).
136 Defenders of Wildlfe II, 420 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997)).
3 7 Id. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169).
1 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). An Incidental Take Statement does not have to be issued
whenever a Biological Opinion is issued because "an Incidental Take Statement must be
predicated on a finding of an incidental take" by a federal agency action subject to
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
273 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2001).
139 "[A]bsent rare circumstances such as those involving migratory species, it is arbitrary
and capricious [for the Fish and Wildlife Service] to issue an Incidental Take Statement
when the ... Service has no rational basis to conclude that a take will occur incident to
the otherwise lawful activity." Arizona Cattle Growers'Ass'n, 273 F.3d at 1242. The
definition of "take" and "taking" in sections 7 and 9 of the ESA "are identical in meaning
and application." Id at 1237.
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(1) the agency action will not violate [section 7(a)(2)], or
offers reasonable and prudent alternatives which the
[Service] believes would not violate such [provision]; (2)
the taking of an endangered [or threatened] species
incidental to the agency action will not violate [section
7(a)(2)]; and (3) if an endangered[] or threatened species of
a marine mammal is involved, the taking is authorized
pursuant to [16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)].1 40
The Incidental Taking Statement must specify: "(1) those reasonable and
prudent measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to
minimize [the] impact[s]" of such incidental takings, (2) the measures
necessary to comply with 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5) in the case of marine
mammals, and (3) "the terms and conditions . . . that must be complied
with by the Federal agency or [permit or license] applicant (if any), or
both, to implement [such] measures .... ,"1
E. Remedy When ESA's Procedural Requirements Are Violated
"Procedural violations [of section 7] of the ESA are not necessarily
mooted by a finding . .. that a substantive violation of the ESA ha[s] not
occurred." 42 A court, in the absence of "unusual circumstances," 143 will
issue an injunction to halt an agency action when there is a substantial
procedural violation of the ESA (such as failure to perform a biological
assessment, failure to engage in consultation, or preparation of an
inadequate Biological Opinion).144 A court also may order the rescission
140 id
141 id
142 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
143 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985).
144 Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988) (failure to
prepare adequate Biological Opinion); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th
Cir. 1987) (failure to consult); Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764 (failure to prepare biological
assessment). Another panel of the 9th Circuit recently stated that "[t]he remedy for a
substantial procedural violation of the ESA - a violation that is not technical or de
minimis - must ... be an injunction of the project pending compliance with the ESA,"
but that a court, however, may allow "non-jeopardizing agency actions to continue during
the consultation process ... [with] the burden . . . on the agency [to show that the action
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of a contract that was entered into by a federal agency in substantial
procedural violation of section 7 of the ESA.145
IV. DISCRETIONARY FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS SUBJECT To § 7(a)(2) OF
THE ESA
Although 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (issued jointly by the FWS and the
NMFS) states that "[s]ection 7 [of the ESA] and the requirements of this
Part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control,"l 46 section 7(a)(2) only refers to an "action
authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal a ency and has no
reference to "discretionary involvement or control." This regulation
does not define the term "discretionary," however.
One court has concluded that because the reference in section
7(a)(2) to an action "authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal
agency "is the only possible source for the regulation's 'discretionary'
qualification of 'all actions,"'l48 the regulation's phrase "actions in which
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control" should be
interpreted "to be coterminous with the statutory phrase limiting section
7(a)(2)'s application to those [actions] 'authorized, funded or carried out'
by a federal agency."l 49
The term "discretionary" also should be interpreted to include a
requirement that an action for which an agency has responsibility (an
action "authorized, funded or carried out" by the agency) must have the
requisite causal connection to the specified impact on a protected species
(a direct or indirect effect "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of [critical habitat].")o50 "[W]here an agency has no
is non-jeopardizing]." Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1034, 1035 (9th Cir.
2006) (citations omitted).
145 Houston, 146 F.3d at 1129.
146 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005).
147 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
148 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d 946, 967 (9th Cir. 2005).
149 Id. at 967, 969.
1so Section 7(a)(2)'s requirement for a requisite causal nexus between an agency action
and a prohibited impact on a protected species is discussed supra notes 41-43.
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ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over
the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant
'cause' of the effect,"' 5 1 and the agency actions therefore should not be
considered "discretionary" actions subject to the requirements of section
7(a)(2). Although the source of an agency's "discretionary involvement or
control" may be in the agency's enabling statute that give the agency
discretionary power to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the
protected listed species in question in taking the action at issue,152 such
"an environmental purpose need not be expressed in the enabling statute to
trigger Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA; ... a stated environmental purpose is
not necessary if the action agency otherwise has discretion to act in such a
way that could benefit the endangered and threatened species."lS3
15 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 963 (quoting Dep't. of Transp. v. Public Citizen,
541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004)).
'
5
'Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(citing Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969,
976 (9th Cir. 2003)).
15 3 Id The court added:
Indeed, most federal agency actions would not be subject to the formal
consultation process under Section 7(a)(2) if the ESA only applied to
agency actions where the agency was already compelled by statute to
protect listed species. Furthermore, a narrow interpretation of the term
"agency action" that only applies Section 7(a)(2) to actions carried out
under environmental statutes would conflict with the broad reading of
the term given by the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit.
Id. Under this approach, the court in National Wildlife Federation held that FEMA has
the discretion under the NFIP, in mapping floodplains, in developing and promulgating
minimum eligibility criteria, and in implementing the Community Rating System, to act
for the benefit of the Puget Sound Chinook salmon (which is listed under the ESA as a
threatened species), except with regard to FEMA's actual sale of flood insurance (which
"FEMA has no discretion to deny to a person in a NFIP-eligible community"). Id. at
1173-74. The court therefore held that FEMA had a duty under section 7(a)(2) of the
ESA to consult with the NMFS on the impacts of the NFIP on the Puget Sound chinook
salmon. Id. at 1173. In Florida Key Deer v. Brown, the court agreed that "FEMA has
sufficient discretion within the framework of the NFIP to implement the NFIP in a
manner consistent with the requirements of the ESA." Fla. Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
Another court held that the "advisory activity" of the FWS in providing advice
to a private timber company as to how the company would have to act, in cutting and
removing dead, dying and decayed trees on the company's private lands, to avoid
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The regulatory history of § 402.03 demonstrates a
consistent intention that section 7 applies when some
meaningful discretionary control or involvement is retained
by an action agency. NOAA and the FWS promulgated the
final regulation § 402.03 in 1978 after resolution of
concerns about issues of retroactivity. They stated the
position that "as long as some Federal discretionary control
or involvement remained that could avoid jeopardizing the
listed species or adversely modifying or destroying its
critical habitat, the degree of completion of a project was
irrelevant." In 1983, there were minor alterations to §
402.03 not dealing with "discretion." In the final regulation
published in 1986, § 402.03 was modified to include the
word "discretionary": "Section 7 and the requirements of
this Part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control." The commentary says
only that the provision, "which explains the applicability of
section 7, implicitly covers Federal activities within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States and upon the
high seas as a result of the definition of action' in §
402.02." There was no comment about the added term
"discretionary."l 54
Consequently, when a federal agency's operation of a facility (such as a
dam) includes both nondiscretionary and discretionary elements, operation
of the facility is not insulated from required compliance with section
7(a)(2) because of the nondiscretionary aspects of the agency action, and
consultation and the Biological Opinion under section 7(a)(2) therefore
must analyze the entire effects of operation of the facility.15 5
committing a prohibited "take" in violation of the ESA, was not an action involving
"discretionary involvement or control" that was subject to the requirements of section
7(a)(2) of the ESA. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIs 16,345,
*26 n.6 (D. Ore. 2005) (citations omitted).
155 Id. at *25-*39. Another court similarly held the Corps of Engineers' operation of the
Missouri River main stem reservoir system is subject to the requirements of section
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One federal district court has concluded that the preamble to the
Services section 7 regulations, which states that "[t]his section, which
explains the applicability of [S]ection 7, implicitly covers Federal
activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and upon
the high seas as a result of the definition of 'action' in § 402.02,"156
"indicates that the language on 'discretionary Federal involvement or
control' contained in 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 pertains to geographical
limitations, rather than discretion to administer the federal activity."' 57
Another court, however, has criticized this interpretation of
"discretionary," stating that "[fjar from supporting the . . . court's
understanding of the definition of 'discretionary,' this excerpt from the
Preamble, on its face, indicates that it is the term 'action' that is
geographically limited, not the term 'discretionary.'"15 This court further
stated:
In addition, the discussion of the amended regulations in
the Final Rule appears to assume that the "action" involved
is discretionary because it repeatedly uses the phrase
"proposed action" interchangeably with the term "action."
This is understandable given that the purpose of the
consultation process is to inform the federal agency of the
consequences of its actions. In particular, the agency should
be told of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that "can
7(a)(2) of the ESA, "because compliance with the ESA does not prevent the Corps from
meeting its statutory duty under the [Flood Control Act of 1944] to support downstream
navigation." In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 631 (8th Cir.
2005). The court added that "the FCA does not mandate a particular level of river flow
or length of navigation season, but rather allows the Corps to decide how best to support
the primary interest of navigation in balance with other interests." Id. However, the
court noted that "if future circumstances should arise in which ESA compliance would
force the Corps to abandon the dominant FCA purposes of flood control or downstream
navigation, the ESA would not apply." Id. at 631 n.9.
156 Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926,
19,937 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
1' Fla. Key Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis
omitted).
158 Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 620 (D. Mass. 1995), aff'dper curiam, 187 F.3d
623 (1st Cir. 1998) (designated as not for publication).
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be implemented consistent with the scope of the Federal
agency's legal authority and jurisdiction" and would "avoid
the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of
listed species or resulting in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat." If the federal agency has
no discretion to modify the activity at issue to
accommodate the mandate of the ESA, then the
consultation process would be pointless.159
A. Federal Agency Action Under a Federal Contract
In an approach that follows this latter court's approach and section
7(a)(2)'s implicit requirement that an agency action must have a requisite
causal connection to the impacts proscribed by section 7(a)(2), federal
courts have held that in certain circumstances section 7(a)(2) can apply to
a federal agency action occurring after the enactment of the ESA that is
undertaken pursuant to a contract that was executed prior to the enactment
of the ESAl 60 In order for this to be the case, the federal agency action
pursuant to a provision of a contract (entered into by the United States or
the federal agency prior to the enactment of the ESA) must allow the
agency to take actions under the contract in a manner that can protect
members of a listed species from the types of harm prohibited by section
7(a)(2).161 In order for this principle to apply, a pre-ESA contract does not
have to explicitly reserve to the United States the power to modify its
duties under the contract to comply with duties under subsequently
enacted federal statutes because the doctrine of unmistakable terms
provides that a contract to which the federal government is a party remains
subject to the requirements of a subsequently enacted federal statute unless
s9 id. at 620-21 (citations omitted) (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (2005)).
16 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v.
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2000); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d
1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). The Klamath
Water Users decision is discussed supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
161 id.
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the contract expressly provides in unmistakable terms that subsequently-
enacted statutes will not affect it.162
Under these principles, the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") has
been held to have the discretion, under long-term contracts to supply water
from federal government reclamation dams and reservoirs which were
executed prior to the enactment of section 7(a)(2), to make annual
allocations of water and to divert water to protect fish and wildlife to the
extent necessary to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. 6 1 Such
discretion was held to be available under a provision in the contracts that
provides that the United States is not liable for any damage, direct or
indirect, arising from a shortage of delivered water on account of errors in
operation, drought, or other causes, because this provision gives the BOR
the authority to allocate and divert water to protect fish and wildlife to the
extent necessary to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.'6 The BOR
162 O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686; Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1139 (Seymour, J.,
concurring).63 Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1113-14, 1130-31, 1138, 1139, 1141;
O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 677.
'" O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 677; Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1109. O'Neill held
"that the contract's liability limitation is unambiguous and that an unavailability of water
resulting from the mandates of valid legislation constitutes a shortage by reason of 'any
other causes."' O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 684. The majority in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
followed the holding in O'Neill and held that several clauses in the contracts, including
the limitation of liability clause and another clause that authorized the federal government
to provide water for fish and wildlife as a beneficial use, establish that the Federal Bureau
of Reclamation ("BOR") "retained the discretion [under the contracts] to determine the
'available water' from which allocations would be made, allotments which, in times of
scarcity, might be altered for 'other causes,' the prevention ofjeopardy to an endangered
species." Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1129. The majority in Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow held that the fact "[t]hat BOR neither owns nor holds rights to native
waters .. . is not determinative of BOR's obligation to consult with FWS and comply
with the ESA. BOR's retaining authority to manage [water diversion and storage] works
triggers its ESA obligations." Id. at 1136 (citing Klamath Water Users, 204 F.3d at
1213). Judge Kelly dissented in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, arguing that the BOR did
not have discretion under the pre-ESA water supply contracts to reduce deliveries of
available water in order to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Id. at 1142-1153
(Kelly, J., dissenting).
In the O'Neill and Rio Grande Silvery Minnow cases, the federal agency actions
that were subject to section 7(a)(2) of the ESA were the BOR's annual allocations and
deliveries of water under the contracts subsequent to the enactment of the ESA, not the
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also has discretion to include a provision in a new water supply contract
that requires allocation and diversion of water to fish and wildlife to the
extent necessary to comply with section 7(a)(2) when the new contract is a
renewal of a pre-ESA long term water supply contract that contains a
provision stating that renewal of the contract shall be under stated terms
and conditions mutually agreed upon by the parties.165
That said, because Congress did not intend to apply section 7
retroactively, section 7(a)(2) does not apply to federal agency action under
a contract with a private party that was entered into prior to the effective
date of section 7(a)(2) and under which the federal agency does not retain
any authority, after the effective date of section 7(a)(2), to act under the
contract to protect members of a listed species or designated critical
habitat of a listed species from the types of harm proscribed by section
7(a)(2).166 In such a situation, the actions of the private party that
execution of the original contracts prior to the enactment of the ESA (as incorrectly stated
by Judge Porfilio for the majority in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow). Id. at 1128; see id. at
1143-44 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
165 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998). The court in
Houston based this holding upon its conclusion that the BOR had discretion "to reduce
the amount of water available for sale [under the renewal contract] if necessary to comply
with the ESA." Id. at 1126. Okanogan County v. Nat '1 Marine Fisheries Serv. similarly
held that the Forest Service's renewal and modification of a contract (a special use permit
conveying a right-of-way for a ditch on federal land) "(as expressly anticipated by the
terms of the previous contract) qualifies as an 'action' that triggers [ESA] section 7
review. With the expiration of the prior permit, the Forest Service begins anew to
negotiate the renewal permit, and is not bound by any language of the prior permit."
Okanogan County v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13,625, *17-18
(E.D. Wash. 2002).
116 Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1511-12 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the federal
agency may not modify a private project or action undertaken pursuant to the contract by
the other private party to the contract in order to prevent the types of harm proscribed by
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Id. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co. similarly
held that the FWS was not required to reinitiate consultation with itself under section
7(a)(2) of the ESA about the effect that an ESA incidental take permit for the northern
spotted owl might have on two other species that were listed as threatened under the ESA
after the permit was issued, when neither the permit nor the accompanying habitat
conservation plan and implementation agreement authorized the FWS to modify the
permit to require the permittee to take steps that would benefit the two newly-listed
species. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir.
2001).
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jeopardize a protected species or its critical habitat should be considered to
have been caused by the original contract that pre-dates the enactment of
the ESA, not by any action of a federal agency pursuant to that contract
after the enactment of the ESA that could not have prevented the harm to
the protected species or its critical habitat.'6 7 Furthermore, when a federal
contract does not give a federal agency discretionary involvement or
control to protect ESA-listed species and their designated critical habitat
from the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2), the ESA does not
give the federal agency "continuing discretion to amend [the contract] at
any time to address the needs of endangered or threatened species."l68
In Sierra Club v. Babbitt,169 a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied these principles to hold that section 7(a)(2) did not apply
to the approval by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), under a
1962 right-of-way agreement, of construction of a logging road by a
private logging company on a right-of-way crossing on forest land owned
by the federal government and managed by the BLM.170 The right-of-way
had been established in 1962 by means of an agreement between the BLM
and Woolley Logging Company, a private logging company.1 7 ' The BLM
entered into this agreement prior to the enactment of section 7 under
federal statutory authority enacted by Congress in 1895.172 The agreement
permitted Woolley to construct new roads on specified federal lands
managed by BLM, subject to the approval of the BLM.17 3 Under the
agreement, BLM was permitted to object to and prevent the proposed
construction of a new road by Woolley
"only if (1) it does not constitute the most reasonably direct
route for the removal of forest products from the lands of
the road builder, taking into account the topography of the
area, the cost of road construction and the safety of use of
167 As discussed infra note 188, this principle is an implicit holding of Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, which is discussed infra notes 169-190 and accompanying text.
168 Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d at 1082.
'6' Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1502.
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such road, (2) the proposed road will substantially interfere
with existing or planned facilities or improvements on the
lands of the landowner, or (3) would result in excessive
erosion to lands of the landowner." 74
In 1991, after the enactment of section 7(a)(2), the BLM approved
an assignment by Woolley to Seneca Sawmill Company, another private
logging company, of Woolley's rights and duties under the right-of-way
agreement after Seneca agreed to conduct its operations so as to comply
with all water quality standards, all pesticide use standards, and "all other
applicable State and Federal environmental laws, regulations and
standards." Seneca also agreed that if it failed to conform to this
environmental stipulation, the BLM was allowed to "discontinue all
construction or other operations under [the] permit upon written notice
from the Authorized Officer that such operations or any part thereof are in
violation of this provision."' 76
In 1990, Seneca sought approval by the BLM under the right-of-
way agreement of its plan to construct a new logging road in order to
conduct logging on privately owned forest land. 7 7 A BLM biologist
determined that the logging on this private land "may affect" Northern
spotted owls (a species listed in 1990 as threatened under the ESA) as well
as critical habitat of that species. '7 The BLM approved Seneca's proposed
road construction, after a BLM Regional Solicitor concluded that the BLM
did not have authority, under either the right-of-way agreement or the
environmental stipulation with Seneca, to control the location or design of
the new road for the benefit of threatened spotted owls. 179
14 Id. at 1506. "[A]lthough the Bureau of Land Management initially had the power to
condition the construction on any terms consistent with its statutory mission, once it
entered into the contract, it limited its power to object to the three specifically listed
conditions." Okanogan County v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2002 U.S. Dist. LExis
13,625, *17 (E.D. Wash. 2002). In other words, BLM "relinquished this power through
contract." Id. at *15.
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A majority of the three-judge panel in Sierra Club v. Babbitt held
that the BLM did not have a duty under section 7(a)(2) to consult with the
FWS prior to the BLM's approval of Seneca's construction of the new
logging road. 80 The majority based this holding upon the grounds that the
BLM lacked the authority, under either the pre-existing right-of-way
agreement or the environmental stipulation that was required by BLM as a
condition for its approval of assignment of the agreement to Seneca, to
regulate the new road construction for the benefit of the threatened spotted
owl.18' The majority concluded (1) under the right-of-way agreement
"[t]he BLM's ability to influence the road's location is limited to notifying
Seneca that the chosen route is not the most direct, that it would interfere
with a BLM facility, or that it would cause excessive erosion,"l 82 (2)
"[n]one of these factors are relevant to the protection of the threatened
spotted owl,"'" and (3) "[t]he environmental stipulation does not . . .
broaden the BLM's power to disapprove of Seneca's right-of-way
construction."' 84
In effect, the majority implicitly held that the federal agency
"action" subject to section 7(a)(2) was the BLM's approval of the
construction of the new road after the enactment of the ESA, and that any
harm that would be indirectly caused to threatened spotted owls by the
construction of the new road would be legally caused by the right-of-way
agreement (that was not subject to section 7 because it was entered into by
the BLM prior to the enactment of the ESA) and not by the BLM's
approval of the construction of the new road (because the BLM had no
1so Id. at 1507-08.
181 See id. at 1507-12.
'" Id. at 1508 n.7.183 id.
1 4Id. at 1511. The majority added that "[t]he stipulation provides the BLM with a
remedial contract right to discontinue Seneca's operations if, and when, there is an
environmental infraction; but the BLM does not need to consult with the FWS for Seneca
to meet its obligation under the stipulation." Id. "Even without the environmental
stipulation, Seneca's operations are subject to all applicable environmental regulations
and laws. The apparent purpose of the stipulation was to allow the BLM to terminate
Seneca's contractual right to complete a project if during the project's implementation
Seneca violated an environmental standard." Id. at 1511 n. 14 (citations omitted).
71
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. I
authority to withhold its approval or to require modification of the road
construction project for the benefit of the threatened spotted owl). 185
In dissent, Judge Pregerson argued the BLM would be engaged in
"discretionary action" for purposes of section 7(a)(2) when it exercised its
authority under the right-of-way agreement to review and approve the
location of the road project to determine if it was the most direct and
reasonable route and if it exercised its authority under the environmental
stipulation in its agreement with Seneca to determine if Seneca's
construction would "take" threatened spotted owls in violation of the
ESA. Judge Pregerson argued that the BLM should have engaged in
consultation with the FWS "to assess whether a 'taking' will occur and to
discontinue Seneca's construction if such is the case, or pursue any viable
alternative which can be worked out given the terms of the contract.,187
Judge Pregerson, however, failed to recognize, as did the majority,18 8 that
section 7 does not require consultation with the FWS to address whether a
prohibited "taking" of a member of a protected species will occur; rather,
consultation under section 7 is for the purpose of determining if the
Federal agency action at issue is likely either to jeopardize the continued
existence of a protected species or to destroy or modify designated critical
habitat of a protected species.
Because the plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Babbitt did not allege or
argue that the BLM was required to comply with section 7(a)(2) in
' Id. at 1508-10.
1
8
1 Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1514 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
188 "[W]hile we agree with the dissent that section 9 of the ESA allows the government to
halt a private activity that is reasonably certain to result in a 'taking,' we are unable to
discern the relevance of the section 7(a)(2) consultation procedures to the enforcement of
the substantive proscriptions contained in section 9." Id. at 1509 n. 10 (citations omitted).
The majority further stated
The section 7 consultation procedures are not relevant to the
enforcement of section 9. If Seneca violates section 9, or any other
environmental standard, the BLM need not consult with the FWS
before exercising its right under the environmental stipulation to
terminate the offending project. Indeed, section 7(a)(1) would appear
to require the BLM to utilize its authority under the stipulation to
suspend an activity that would result in a taking.
Id. at 1511 n. 15 (citations omitted).
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approving the right-of-way assignment to Seneca, the majority did not
address that issue and Judge Pregerson did not address that issue in his
dissent. The majority rejected, as a "remarkable proposition . . .
unsupported by legal authority," the plaintiffs argument "that the BLM's
failure to include language in [its] agreement [with Seneca] allowing for
section 7(a)(2) compliance requires this court to read the environmental
stipulation as if it did provide for consultation."1 90
However, if either the right-of-way agreement, federal statutory
law, or BLM regulations pre-dating the enactment of the ESA gave the
BLM discretion as to whether to approve the assignment of the right-of-
way agreement to Seneca and whether to require Seneca to agree to
environmental stipulations to protect the threatened spotted owl as a
condition for BLM's approval of the assignment of the right-of-way
agreement, the BLM's approval of the assignment should have been held
to be a "discretionary action" of a federal agency that was subject to
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. If such circumstances had been present, the
BLM's failure to include an environmental stipulation to protect the
threatened spotted owl in the agreement with Seneca should have been
held to be in violation of section 7(a)(2), requiring the court to order
rescission of both BLM's approval of the assignment and the agreement
between the BLM and Seneca containing environmental stipulations.
Furthermore, a federal agency must presently comply with the
substantive and procedural requirements of section 7(a)(2) in executing a
new contract after the enactment of that section both when it enters into a
new contract with a private entity after the effective date of the ESA,191
and when it exercises discretion after the effective date of the ESA to
renew a contract that was entered into before the effective date of the
ESA.192 When a Federal agency, after the effective date of the ESA, enters
into a new contract with a private entity or exercises discretion to renew a
pre-existing contract with a private entity without complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements of section 7, a federal court may
"
9 Id. at 1511 n.12.
19o Id.
191 Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st Cir. 1979).
192 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1126-28 (9th Cir. 1998).
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order the rescission of the contract, requiring the federal agency to comply
with section 7(a)(2) before re-executing the contract.'9 3
B. Federal Agency Action Carrying Out a Directive of the President, a
Court Order, or Congress
A federal agency action that carries out a decision or directive of
the President of the United States is not an agency action over which the
agency has "discretionary involvement or control" and the agency action
carrying out a Presidential decision or directive is therefore not subject to
the requirements of section 7(a)(2).194 For example, the U.S. Navy was not
required to engage in consultation under section 7(a)(2) on the potential
impact on two species of salmon listed as threatened species under the
ESA, due to an accidental explosion of propellant fuel in a Trident II
missile at the Bangor, Washington, Trident submarine base.' 95 The court
reasoned that because the President ordered the Trident II submarines and
missiles to be located at this base, "the Navy lacks the discretion to cease
Trident II operations at Bangor for the protection of the listed species ...
[and] any consultation by the Navy with NMFS regarding the risks of
accidental Trident II explosion on the threatened salmon species, if such
risks arise solely from the President's siting decision, would be an exercise
in futility."l 96 In such a situation, any resulting harm to a listed species or
its critical habitat is proximately caused by the President, not by the
agency action carrying out the President's directive, so as a matter of law
the agency action should not be considered to jeopardize the existence of a
listed species or to adversely modify designated critical habitat in violation
of section 7(a)(2).197
Id. at 1129.
194 Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. Dep't. of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1087-
88 (9th Cir. 2004).
19s id.
9 Id. at 1092.
197 This causation analysis is similar to the approach applied by the United States
Supreme Court in Dep't. of Transp. v. Public Citizen in interpreting section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA. In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court held that the FMSCA (an agency within the
Department of Transportation), in deciding whether to prepare an environmental impact
statement under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA with respect to proposed FMSCA
regulations that would establish safety and financial responsibility standards for Mexican
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A federal agency action mandated by a court decision, an
international treaty, or a federal statute enacted by Congress also is not an
action over which a federal agency has "discretionary Federal involvement
or control" and therefore is not subject to the requirements of section
7(a)(2).198 As a result, the Secretary of Interior was not required to engage
in consultation under section 7(a)(2) with regard to the impact on
protected listed species in the Colorado River Delta in Mexico as a result
of the operation by the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) of dams and
reservoirs on the Colorado River and its allocation and diversion of water
in the Colorado River.199 The court found the Secretary has no discretion
as to the allocation of Colorado River water because of "a Supreme Court
injunction, an international treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between
the government and water users that account for every acre foot of lower
Colorado River water." 200 In this situation, the proximate cause of any
harm to listed species in Mexico was a result of the combined effects of
the Supreme Court injunction, the treaty, the statutes, and the contracts
that legally allocated all available Colorado River water, rather than the
actions of the Interior Department and BOR in implementing these legal
allocations of water.
In addition, federal courts have uniformly held that a federal
agency's issuance of a permit or license, under a statute (other than the
ESA) that states that the agency "shall" issue a permit or license to a
person when the agency finds that specific listed criteria and conditions
are present, is not an agency action subject to section 7(a)(2) because the
action is not one for which the agency has "discretionary Federal
involvement or control" within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 when
trucks operating within the United States, did not have to consider the environmental
impacts from increased air pollution resulting from increased cross-border operations of
Mexican trucks within the United States, because the increased presence of Mexican
trucks within the United States was the result of an action of the President of the United
States which the FMSCA has no ability to countermand or alter. Dep't of Transp. v.
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004). In support of this holding, the Supreme Court
stated "that where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited
statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally
relevant 'cause' of the effect." Id.
198 Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2003).
'99 Id. at 69.200 d
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the listed criteria and conditions do not allow the agency to condition the
permit or license upon requirements that prohibit the types of harms
proscribed by section 7(a)(2) .201 In such a situation, any harm to an ESA-
listed species or designated critical habitat of a listed species, resulting
from a federal agency's ministerial task of issuing such a permit or
license, is proximately caused by Congress, not by the agency action that
is simply following a congressional mandate. As a matter of law the
201 Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 620-22 (D. Mass. 1995), aff'dper curiam, 187
F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998) (designated as not for publication). In Strahan v. Linnon, the
Coast Guard's issuance of Certificates of Documentation and Inspection to vessels,
"which allow numerous private vessels to operate in the [United State's] coastal waters,"
and which vessels "cannot legally operate within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline without
a certificate from the Coast Guard (or from the state government)," were held to be
nondiscretionary action not subject to section 7 of the ESA, because "[t]he Coast Guard
is required to issue Certificates of Documentation and Inspection if the specific statutory
and regulatory criteria, which make no reference to environmental concerns, are met."
Id. at 621, 611.
Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm 'n, held that the FERC's issuance of an annual Federal Power Act
("FPA") license to a hydroelectric facility whose expired original license did not include
any express reservation of modification authority that would authorize the FERC to add
environmentally protective conditions to the annual license that could protect species
listed under the ESA, is not subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.
Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This holding in Platte River was based on the
fact that the FERC is required to issue an annual license under the terms and conditions
of the original license and therefore does not have statutory authority in such a situation
to impose conditions in an annual license to protect species listed under the ESA. Id. at
32-33. The court in Platte River based this holding upon the "limitations on FERC's
authority contained in the FPA," rather than upon the lack of "discretionary Federal
involvement or control" by the FERC within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03. Id. at
34. Apparently referring to section 7(a)(1) of the ESA, the court in Platte River stated
that the ESA "directs agencies to 'utilize their authorities' to carry out the ESA's
objectives; it does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling act." Id.
Although the court's reliance upon section 7(a)(1) to interpret section 7(a)(2) is an
erroneous approach, because section 7(a)(2) imposes requirements upon a federal agency
that are separate and distinct from the duties imposed by section 7(a)(1), the holding in
Platte River can be supported under 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 on the grounds that the FERC
had no "discretionary Federal involvement or control" over the issuance of an annual
license without conditions to protect species listed under the ESA when the original
license did not contain such conditions. Id.
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agency action should not be considered to violate section 7(a)(2) by
jeopardizing the existence of a listed species or adversely modifying
designated critical habitat.
On the other hand, a federal agency is required to comply with
section 7(a)(2), including its consultation requirements, prior to the
issuance of a license or permit under a statute, including the ESA,2 02 when
the federal agency has discretionary authority under a federal statute in
issuing a license or permit, and in imposing conditions in a license or
permit, to act for the protection and conservation of protected species
listed under the ESA.203
202 The FWS's issuance of an incidental take permit under section 10 of the ESA is an
agency action that is subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Envtl.
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).
203 Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005) (EPA registration of
pesticides under FIFRA held to be an action involving "discretionary Federal
involvement or control" because EPA has "discretion 'to inure to the benefit' of listed
species" in its registration of pesticides, alteration of pesticide registrations and
cancellation of pesticide registrations under FIFRA, so EPA is required to comply with
the consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA before registering a pesticide
under FIFRA); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340
F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003). Turtle Island held that the issuance of fishing permits by the
NMFS to U.S. flag-flying fishing vessels (which use longlines that may have thousands
of hooks while fishing on the high seas, in which members of sea turtle and albatross
species listed as endangered under the ESA can become entangled and injured or killed),
pursuant to the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act, is subject to the consultation
requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA because "the plain language of the
Compliance Act does contain ample discretion to allow the conditioning of permits for
the benefit of protected species. . ." listed under the ESA. Id. at 970-71. The court based
this holding, that "the statutory language of the Compliance Act confers sufficient
discretion to the [NMFS] so that the agency could condition permits to benefit listed
species," upon a provision in the Compliance Act which states that "[t]he Secretary shall
establish such conditions and restrictions on each permit issued under this section as are
necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations of the United States under the
Agreement [to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas], including but not limited to "the
markings of vessels and reporting requirements," and upon a provision of the Agreement
that requires each nation party to "take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that
fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag do not engage in any activity that undermines the
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures." Id. at 973, 975-
76. The court held that the language of these provisions of the Compliance Act provides
the NMFS "with ample discretion to protect listed species." Id. at 975.
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C. Federal Agency Delegation ofPermit-Issuing Authority to a State
Federal courts at present are in disagreement as to whether the
requirements of section 7(a)(2), including its consultation requirements,
apply to a federal agency's action in delegating authority to a state to issue
federal permits or licenses under another federal statute that specifies that
the federal agency "shall" delegate that authority to a state when specified
criteria are satisfied, when the criteria for delegating permit or license-
issuing authority under the other statute do not permit the federal agency
to require the state to condition permits issued under that delegated
authority upon compliance with the procedural and substantive
requirements of section 7(a)(2).
In 1998, in American Forest and Paper Assoc. v. US.
Environmental Protection Agency,2 04 a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the EPA's authority under section 402(b) of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 205 to delegate authority to a state to issue permits
under section 402 to point source dischargers of water pollutants, was not
action subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2). 206 The court held that
EPA therefore violated the CWA in requiring the state of Louisiana to
consult with federal agencies concerning the impact on ESA-protected
species of a point source discharger's pollutant discharges before issuing a
section 402 permit to the discharger, and in providing for EPA veto of any
state-issued section 402 permit to which FWS or NMFS objected because
the proposed permit was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
species protected under the ESA or destroy designated critical habitat. 207
Conversely, in 2005 a majority of a panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held, in Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (Defenders of Wildhfe J),208 that the EPA was required
to comply with the requirements of section 7(a)(2), including its
consultation requirements, before delegating authority to a state to issue
section 402 CWA permits to point source dischargers of pollutants and
20 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998).
205 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
206 Am. Forest, 137 F.3d at 299.
207 Id. at 293-94, 297-98.
208 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 450 F.3d 394 (9th Cir.
2006).
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that in order to comply with section 7(a)(2), the EPA would have to
require the state to comply with the substantive "no jeopardize"
requirements of section 7(a)(2) before issuing section 402 permits.209 The
Defenders of Wildlife II majority, however, found that the EPA in the case
"makes no argument that its transfer decision was not a 'discretionary' one
within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. §402.03.",210 Also, the majority found that
EPA had taken the position in the litigation that the court did not have
before it the question of whether the EPA has "sufficient discretion,
applying 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, under the Endangered Species Act" in
deciding whether to delegate CWA section permitting authority to a state,
to make the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applicable to such
an EPA decision.21 1 The Defenders of Wildlife II majority did not address
the question whether the EPA has sufficient discretion in making such a
decision to "trigger" consultation under section 7(a)(2) regarding the
transfer of section 402 permitting authority to a state.212
In American Forest and Paper Assoc., a unanimous panel of the
Fifth Circuit held the EPA violated section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act
in conditioning EPA's approval of delegation to the state of Louisiana, of
the authority to issue CWA section 402 permits, upon a requirement that
the state consult either with the FWS or NMFS before the state issued any
section 402 permit or have the EPA veto the state-issued permit. 2 13 Section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act provides that the EPA "shall" approve
delegation of section 402 permitting authority to a state which has applied
for such authority and submitted a proposed state program to the EPA
unless the state's program fails to meet one or more of the nine
requirements listed in section 402(b) of the CWA American Forest held
that the EPA has a non-discretionary duty under section 402(b) to approve
a state's program unless the EPA determines that a proposed state permit
program does not meet these nine requirements. 2 14 The court held that no
provision of the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA either to condition
9 Id. at 971-78.
210 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 968.
211 Id. at 969 n.19.
2 12 id.
2 13 Am. Forest, 137 F.3d at 297-98.
214 Id. at 297. None of the nine requirements listed in section 402(b) refer to complying
with the ESA or even protecting fish, wildlife, or the environment. Id.
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approval of permit-issuing authority delegation to a state upon protection
of endangered species or to veto a state's issuance of a section 402 permit
to protect endangered species.215 The court also found that under the
Endangered Species Act section 7(a)(2) does not confer authority upon the
EPA to condition delegation of CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority
upon the state consulting with the FWS or NMFS before issuing a section
402 permit or otherwise acting to protect ESA-listed species when issuing
such a permit, because "if EPA lacks the power [under the CWA] to add
additional criteria to CWA § 402(b), nothing in the ESA grants the agency
the authority to do so. Section 7 of the ESA merely requires EPA to
consult with FWS or NMFS before undertaking agency action; it confers
no substantive powers." 216 The court in American Forest also relied upon
the holding in Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance
Trust v. FERC217 that section 7(a)(2) "does not expand the powers
conferred on an agency by its enabling act," with the Fifth Circuit panel
noting that Platte River stated that the ESA instead "directs the agencies to
'utilize' their existing powers to protect endangered species." 2 18 The court
in American Forest also relied upon Platte River's holding that section 7
does not mandate a federal agency to do whatever it takes to protect listed
endangered and threatened species and section 7 does not "implicitly
supersede[]" any limitations on an agency's authority in its enabling
219statute. The court concluded by stating that "[w]e agree that the ESA
serves not as a font of new authority, but as something far more modest: a
directive to agencies to channel their existing authority in a particular
direction. The upshot is the EPA cannot invoke the ESA as a means of
2151 d. at 298.216Id. The court additionally stated that
Whether EPA's approval of Louisiana's permitting program constitutes
"agency action" for ESA purposes is largely beside the point. Even if
EPA were required to consult with the agencies before approving
Louisiana's program, EPA lacks authority to modify the plain language
of the CWA by adding to the list of enumerated requirements.
Id. at 298 n.6.
217 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Platte River case is discussed supra note 201.218 Am. Forest, 137 F.3d at 299 (quoting Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat
Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
219 id
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creating and imposing requirements that are not authorized by the
CWA."9220
Although the court's statement in American Forest that "section 7
of the ESA merely requires EPA to consult with FWS or NMFS before
undertaking agency action" mistakenly fails to refer to section 7(a)(2)'s
other procedural requirements (biological assessment, biological opinion
and incidental take statement) and section 7(a)(2)'s substantive "no
jeopardize" standards, the court correctly held in American Forest that
section 7(a)(2) does not expand the scope of a federal agency's powers and
duties under an agency's enabling statute. The Fifth Circuit's holding in
American Forest is a correct interpretation of section 7(a)(2) even though
the court failed to state that its holding could be based alternatively upon a
finding that EPA has no "discretionary Federal involvement or control"
under CWA section 402(b) within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 in
deciding whether to delegate section 402 permitting authority to a state.22'
When the EPA decides whether to approve a state program for delegation
of section 402 permitting authority, the EPA is performing a non-
discretionary ministerial duty and cannot take any action that would
benefit any species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA. This
alternative basis in support of the American Forest holding is similar to
the rationale used by courts holding that section 7(a)(2) does not apply to a
federal agency's non-discretionary, ministerial action of issuing a permit
or license under an enabling statute that states the agency "shall" issue the
permit or license when specified criteria are present that do not permit the
agency to act in a manner that can benefit species listed as endangered or
threatened under the ESA.222
As in the cases when a federal agency performs a non-
discretionary ministerial action issuing a permit or license under an
enabling statute, when the EPA's delegation of permit-issuing authority to
a state under section 402(b) results in harm to species listed as endangered
220 Id. (emphasis omitted).
221 This assertion is based upon the fact, noted by the Fifth Circuit in American Forest,
that section 402(b) of the CWA states that EPA "shall" approve a state's application to be
delegated CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority if EPA finds that the state satisfies
nine requirements listed in section 402(b) (none of which refer to complying with the
ESA or even protecting fish, wildlife or the environment).
222 These court decisions are discussed infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
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or threatened under the ESA, the proximate cause of harm is the
enactment by Congress of the statutory provision directing EPA to
delegate authority to a state when statutorily-specified criteria are present.
In such situations, the proximate cause of harm to protected listed species
is not the non-discretionary ministerial act of a federal agency in following
a mandate of Congress to issue a permit or license or to delegate to a state
the authority to issue federal permits or licenses.
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit holding in American Forest and
Paper Ass'n, a majority panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Defenders of Wildlife II, held that the EPA violated section 7(a)(2) by
delegating to the State of Arizona permit-issuing authority under section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act without insuring that issuance of CWA
permits by Arizona was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
listed species protected under the ESA or to destroy or adversely modify
designated critical habitat of such species.223 As noted earlier, the majority
in Defenders of Wildlife reached this decision after finding that the EPA
was not arguing that the EPA did not have sufficient "discretionary
Federal involvement or control," for purposes of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, in
deciding whether to delegate CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority to
Arizona.224 The Defenders of Wildlife majority vacated the EPA's decision
approving Arizona's pollution-permitting application and the EPA's
delegation of CWA permitting authority to Arizona,225 raising questions
about whether the EPA's delegation of permit-issuing authority to states
other than Arizona within the 9th Circuit's jurisdiction may also be
vacated for not complying with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.
The EPA consulted with FWS under section 7 before approving
the delegation of permit-issuing authority to Arizona and was informed by
FWS staff during consultation that listed species protected by the ESA and
the designated critical habitat of species could be harmed by Arizona's
issuance of section 402 permits that do not require the types of mitigating
measures meant to protect listed species that the EPA requires in EPA-
223 Defenders of Wildhife 11, 420 F.3d at 961-62, 971-78.
24 Id. at 968, 970 n.19. If the EPA did not have such discretionary involvement or
control over its decision as to whether to delegate section 402 permit-issuing authority to
Arizona, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 would make section 7(a)(2) inapplicable to EPA's decision
as to whether to delegate section 402 permit-issuing authority to Arizona.225Id. at 979.
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issued permits.226 Nevertheless, FWS "issued a Biological Opinion
recommending approval of the transfer of permitting authority to
Arizona."227 In the Biological Opinion, FWS concluded that the EPA's
transfer of permitting authority to Arizona would not have indirect effects
upon species protected by the ESA. 228 FWS' Biological Opinion and the
EPA both determined that the EPA could not base its decision whether to
approve delegation of section 402 permit-issuing authority to Arizona
upon adverse effects upon listed species protected by the ESA. 229 The
EPA therefore delegated CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority to
Arizona in 2002,230 without the conditions that had been imposed upon the
state of Louisiana when it had received permit-issuing authority. 23 1
The Defenders of Wildlife II court claimed subject matter
jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1) 2 32 of the Clean Water Act to address
the claim that the EPA violated section 7(a)(2) in delegating section 402
permit-issuing authority to Arizona and held that the court could review
the adequacy of both the EPA's consultation with FWS and the FWS'
Biological Opinion.233
Turning to the merits, the Defenders of Wildlife II majority found
that during the administrative proceedings, the EPA acted with the
contradictory beliefs that the EPA had to consult with FWS before
delegating permit-issuing authority to Arizona,2 34 but could not base its
decision as to whether to approve delegation of permit-issuing authority to
Arizona upon the substantive "no jeopardize/adversely modify"
requirements of section 7(a)(2).235 The majority found that "[s]ection
7(a)(2) makes no legal distinction between the trigger for its requirement
that agencies consult with FWS and the trigger for its requirement that
agencies shape their actions so as not to jeopardize endangered
2261 d. at 952.227 Id. at 953.
228 id.229 d230 Id. at 954.
231 Id. at 953-54.
232 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2000).
233 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 955-56.
234 Id. at 960-61.235Id. at 961.
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species."236 The majority held that the EPA's "ultimate decision was not
the result of reasoned decisionmaking" because it was based "on
contradictory views of the same words in the same statutory provision,"237
and held that "the obligation to consult - which, under the regulations,
applies only to federal agency actions that 'may affect' listed species -
and the reasons given in the Biological Opinion for concluding that the
transfer decision would not have an indirect effect on endangered species
cannot coexist under section 7(a)(2)."238 The majority explained:
The Biological Opinion reasoned that there could be no
such [indirect] effect, because (1) the EPA had no authority
to disapprove transfer applications because of an impact on
listed species, section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act notwithstanding; (2) any impact on the post-transfer
protection of listed species was the result of Congress'
determination that states have no consultation or mitigation
obligations, not of the transfer decision; and (3) the
potential future impact on listed species would be caused
entirely by new private development, and the transfer
decision would not cause such development. By relying on
this line of reasoning after determining that it did have a
consultation obligation, the EPA decided that it had to
consult but had no authority to do anything concerning the
matter about which it had to consult. One would not expect
that Congress would set up such a nonsensical regime. Not
surprisingly, it did not.239
236 d
237 d
238 Id. at 960 (citations omitted).
239 Id. at 960-61. The majority added that
Additionally, the third prong of the Biological Opinion's reasoning -
that it is private development, not the EPA's transfer decision, that
would cause any impact on listed species - suffers from independent
lack of plausibility . . . . Events can be caused by several actions in a
"but for" causal chain .... Obviously, without private decisions to
construct new developments, there will be no Clean Water Act
construction permits and no impact from the issuance of such permits
on listed species or their habitats. Just as obviously, without the transfer
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The majority therefore held the EPA's decision to delegate CWA section
402 permit-issuing authority to Arizona "cannot stand," and remanded to
the EPA "for a plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single,
coherent interpretation of the statute." 240
The Defenders of Wildlife majority, however, did not state that the
EPA could not legally have relied upon this line of reasoning to decide
that it had no duty to consult under section 7(a)(2) in acting under CWA
section 402(b) to decide whether to delegate CWA permit-issuing
authority to a state. As discussed supra in parts IV(A) and IV(B) of this
article, this reasoning has been relied upon by a number of courts to hold
that a federal agency does not have "discretionary involvement or control"
within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, over an action that another
statute mandates the agency to undertake when specified criteria are
present that do not include protection of species listed under the ESA from
the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2).
The Defenders of Wildlife II majority did not indicate whether the
EPA, on remand, could change its position with respect to the duty to
consult under section 7(a)(2) with respect to its decision as to whether to
transfer CWA permit-issuing authority to the state of Arizona and take the
position that none of the requirements of section 7(a)(2) apply to the
EPA's decision as to whether to transfer section 402 permit-issuing
authority. Because "an agency is not locked into a particular position
forever . .. [and] is entitled to change its view over time,"241 the EPA on
of permitting authority from the federal to state government, developers
could be required, as they were before the transfer decision, to mitigate
any impact from their development on listed species. So the impact of
private development will be different depending upon whether the
federal or state government does the permitting. In other words, the two
sets of decisions together .. .but not either one independently, have the
potential to affect listed species and their habitat. The Biological
Opinion's determination to the contrary disregards the obvious cause
analysis and thus fails the reasoned decisionmaking standard.
Id. at 961-62.
240 1d. at 962.
241 Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. EPA (Defenders of Wildhife Ill), 450 F.3d 394, 396 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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remand in Defenders of Wildlife H should be permitted to change its
position and to adopt the position of the FWS in its biological opinion that
the EPA's transfer decision is not subject to the requirements of section
7(a)(2).
In dissent, Judge Thompson argued in Defenders of Wildlife II that
section 7(a)(2) does not apply to the EPA's decision as to whether to
transfer CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority to a state because the
EPA does not have "discretionary Federal involvement or control" under
section 402(b) of the CWA, within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, "to
consider the impact on endangered and threatened species in making its
decision to transfer administration of the [CWA section 402] permitting
system to the State of Arizona." 242 Judge Thompson argued that the
Defenders of Wildlife II majority incorrectly held that "any action which
comes within a federal agency's decisionmaking authority falls within the
scope of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act," when 9th Circuit
cases "recognize[] that an agency may have decisionmaking authority and
yet not be empowered, either as an initial matter or in conjunction with
some continuing authority, to act to protect endangered or threatened
species." 243 Judge Thompson argued, in agreement with the Fifth Circuit's
American Forest decision, that the EPA's decision as to whether to
approve a state's application for delegation of CWA section 402 permit-
issuing authority must be based exclusively upon the nine factors
enumerated in section 402(b) of the CWA. 44 Judge Thompson also
argued that the court should deny the petition for review of the EPA's
transfer decision, despite the EPA's position that it had a duty to consult
under section 7(a)(2) before making this transfer decision, on the ground
that the issue of whether section 7(a)(2) applies to the EPA's transfer
decision involves a federal agency's mandate under a statute that is an
issue of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo by a court, without the
court being bound by EPA's interpretation of its consultation duty under
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.245
242 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 979 (citing Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1996);
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-10 (9th Cir. 1995); Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. Nat'1 Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2003)).
244 Id. at 980.
245 Id. at 981, 981 n.1.
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Although the Defenders of Wildlife II majority stated that it was
remanding to the EPA to reconsider what the majority considered to be
contradictory positions, the majority proceeded to "conduct[] the very
analysis that [the] EPA should have had an opportunity to conduct for
itself"24 6 on remand, and concluded that the EPA was required to comply
with the substantive no jeopardize/harm requirements of section 7(a)(2)
when transferring permit-issuing authority to the state of Arizona.2  The
majority based this conclusion in part upon its determination that the loss
of federal agency consultation under section 7(a)(2) is an indirect effect of
the EPA's transfer of CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority to
Arizona.248 The majority reached this conclusion despite stating that under
section 7(a)(2), "a negative impact on listed species is the likely direct or
indirect effect of an agency's action only if the agency has some control
over that result," 249 and "that where an agency has no ability to prevent a
certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant
actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant "cause" of the
effect."' 2
50
The majority essentially ignored these principles that would have
otherwise led the majority to follow the reasoning in Judge Thompson's
dissent, and held that the EPA, which did not argue that its transfer
decision was exempt from section 7(a)(2) because it involved
"discretionary Federal involvement or control" within the meaning of 50
251C.F.R. § 402.03, can consider and act upon the loss of section 7
consultation benefits in deciding whether to transfer CWA section 402
permit-issuing authority to Arizona.252 The Defenders of Wildlife II
majority also found that the EPA's transfer decision can be considered a
cause of the loss of section 7 consultation benefits - a loss that the
majority held should have been included in the Biological Opinion as an
246 Defenders of Wildhife III, 450 F.3d at 397 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
247 Defenders of Wildhife H, 420 F.3d at 971.
248 id.
249 Id. at 962.
250 Id. at 963 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004))
(interpreting section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA). This holding in Public Citizen is discussed
supra note 197.
251 Id. at 968.
252 Id. at 963.
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indirect effect of the potential transfer decision and that should have been
considered and acted upon by the EPA in complying with section 7(a)(2)
of the ESA.253 The majority interpreted section 7(a)(2) as "conferring an
additional, do-no-harm obligation - and reciprocal authority - applicable
when the agency's own actions . . . cause harm to endangered species"254
and as "specif[ying] that agencies must when acting affirmatively refrain
from jeopardizing listed species, even if the agency's governing statute
does not so provide."255 The majority also stated that section 7(a)(2)
"confers authority and responsibility on [federal] agencies to protect listed
species when the agency engages in affirmative action that is both within
its decisionmaking authority and unconstrained by earlier agency
commitments,"256 and held that "[t]he decision to approve a state's
pollution permitting application meets these criteria and is thus the sort of
decision to which section 7(a)(2) applies."257 The majority held that "[tlhe
Biological Opinion's reasoning that the EPA had no choice but to
disregard the impact of the transfer on listed species in Arizona was
therefore inconsistent with the statute." 258
The Defenders of Wildhfe II majority found that an "action[] in
which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control" under 50
C.F.R. § 402.03 should be interpreted "to be coterminous with the
statutory phrase limiting section 7(a)(2)'s application to those [actions]
'authorized, funded, or carried out' by a federal agency." 259 According to
the majority, section 7(a)(2) applies "where the agency in question had
continuing decisionmaking authority over the challenged action" 26 0 but is
"inapplicable if the agency in question had 'no ongoing regulatory
authority' and thus was not an entity responsible for decisionmaking with
respect to the particular action in question."261
253 d
254Id. at 965.
255 Id. at 967.256 id.257 id.258 d
25 91Id. at 967, 969.
260 Id. at 968.26 1 Id. (quoting Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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The Defenders of Wildlife II majority panel indicated that its
holding is supported by the First Circuit's decision in Conservation Law
Foundation v. Andrus, 2 in which the court stated that the Department of
Interior had to comply with section 7(a)(2) for each stage of oil and gas
development under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).
However, the Andrus case does not support the Defender of Wildlife
majority decision, because the Andrus decision accepted the position of
the Secretary of Interior that the standards of OCSLA and section 7(a)(2)
"are complementary, and [that] the ESA will continue to apply of its own
force to major action taken by the Secretary after the [OCSLA] lease sale
is held.,264 Furthermore, the Andrus decision was issued prior to the
promulgation of 50 C.F.R § 402.03 and did not consider the issue of
whether section 7(a)(2) is inapplicable to OCSLA oil and gas leasing,
exploration, and production because of the lack of discretion by the
Interior Department to protect species listed under the ESA.265 The
Defenders of Wildhfe II majority decision also relied upon the Eighth
Circuit decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA,2 in
which the Eighth Circuit stated that a federal agency must comply with the
ESA when acting under another federal statute - but the only issue under
the ESA that the Eighth Circuit addressed was whether the EPA's
registration of a pesticide violated the ESA's "take" prohibitions.267
The majority supported its position by criticizing the holding in
Platte River2 68 on the ground that the court in Platte River incorrectly
relied upon section 7(a)(1).269 Even though Platte River incorrectly relied
upon section 7(a)(1) in support of its holding, the Platte River decision
correctly held that section 7(a)(2) does not apply to a federal agency's
262 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979).
263 id
264 Id at 715.
265 The OCSLA in fact does give the Interior Department sufficient discretion in
approving OCSLA oil and gas leases, exploration and production to act in a manner to
protect species listed under the ESA to avoid the harms proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
266 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).267 Id at 1300. The court quoted section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, but the court did not analyze
that section or its applicability to the facts of the case. Id. at 1299-1300.
268 The Platte River decision is discussed supra note 201.
269 Defenders of Wildlfe II, 420 F.3d 946, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2005).
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license issuance under an enabling statute that gives the agency no
discretion to act in a manner to protect species listed under the ESA. 270
Finally, the Defenders of Wildhfe II majority criticized the holding in
American Forest on the ground that the Fifth Circuit panel incorrectly
stated that "the consultation and assurance aspects" of section 7(a)(2) are
"independent," 271 but the Defenders of Wildhfe majority did not criticize
American Forest's determination that EPA does not have "discretionary
involvement or control" under section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act in
deciding whether to transfer CWA section 402 permit-issuing authority.
The majority then concluded that the EPA erred by relying on a
Biological Opinion that was deficient for failing to consider, as an indirect
effect of EPA's transfer decision, the harm that EPA's transfer decision
will cause "from the loss of section 7 consultation on the many projects
subject to a water pollution permit." 272 The majority found that the EPA
had not insured that section 7(a)(2)'s substantive requirements would be
not be violated by its action of entering into a non-binding memorandum
of agreement 27 3 with the FWS and NMFS that does not give "the federal
government any authority to require Arizona to engage in the kind of
consultation and mitigation measures EPA had conducted before the
transfer."274 This finding was based on the facts that this non-binding
agreement, EPA's oversight under section 402(c) 275 of the Clean Water
Act of state-issued CWA section 402 permits, the ESA's "take"
prohibitions and Arizona state laws are not "sufficient substitutes for
section 7's consultation and mitigation mandates."276
270 This ground for finding that Platte River was correctly decided is presented supra
notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
271 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 971.
272 d
273 See 66 Fed. Reg. 11,202 (Feb. 22, 2001).
274 Defenders of Wildlife II, 420 F.3d at 973.
275 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2000).
276 Defenders of Wildlife 1, 420 F.3d at 973. The majority also stated that EPA had not
established that the state of Arizona was bound by a letter from an official of the Arizona
Game and Fish Department assuring that species protected by the ESA would not be
adversely impacted by the lack of section 7 consultation by Arizona when issuing CWA
section 402 permits, because that state department does not issue the state's CWA section
402 permits and the state of Arizona is not legally required to follow this letter. Id. at
977. The majority stated that
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The Defenders of Wildlife II majority concluded:
It is possible that some combination of state and federal
protections for listed species and state agency cooperation
with the federal Memorandum of Agreement might
sufficiently replace the benefits of section 7 consultation so
that no harm to listed species would be "reasonably likely
to occur" as a result of losing section 7 consultation. But
the EPA could not so conclude without specifically
analyzing each listed species within Arizona and without
more certain assurances of voluntary state cooperation from
officials at all relevant Arizona agencies, as well as a more
careful consideration of the actual protection accorded by
other federal and state statutory provisions and the
Memorandum of Agreement. 277
The majority in Defenders of Wildlife II vacated the EPA's decision to
approve Arizona's application for delegation of CWA section 402 permit-
issuing authority, 278 but did not reverse the section 402 permits that
Arizona had issued under that delegated authority. 279 The majority,
however, declined to exercise equitable discretion to allow Arizona to
maintain its permit-issuing authority while the EPA complies with the
majority's decision on remand, because it had "no strong assurances that
these permits [issued in the future by Arizona] will not allow development
[I]n the abstract, voluntary compliance by state agencies willing to
follow FWS recommendations to the same extent as would the EPA
might substitute for section 7 coverage. The EPA, however, could not
so conclude without first analyzing the likelihood that all relevant
Arizona agencies can and would live up to the Game and Fish
Department's promises, as well as considering the effectiveness of
federal oversight if Arizona agencies fail to live up to any such
promises.
Id. at 977.
277 Id. (citations omitted).
278 Id. at 979.
79Id. at 978.
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projects that are likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify
their [critical] habitat."2 80
In an opinion dissenting from the denial by the full court of the
Ninth Circuit of rehearing en banc of the Defenders of Wildlife II case,
Judge Kozinski, joined by five other judges of the Ninth Circuit, identified
the misinterpretations of the Endangered Species Act by the Defenders of
Wildhfe majority and the serious adverse impacts that may result from the
Defenders of Wildhife majority opinion.28 1 Judge Kozinski first correctly
noted that the Defenders of Wildlife "majority fail[ed] to give appropriate
deference to FWS's interpretation (in its Biological Opinion) of the
ESA'282 as not being applicable to EPA's transfer decision. Judge
Kozinski correctly argued that this FWS interpretation is entitled to
Chevron deference 283 and that the Defenders of Wildhfe II majority did not
give the required substantial deference to FWS's interpretation of 50
C.F.R. § 402.03.284 Judge Kozinski stressed that "[h]ere, FWS
determined-after careful study at the local and national levels-that the
ESA was inapplicable to EPA's decision, and it issued a [Biological
Opinion] relaying its conclusion to the EPA."285 He asserted that "[t]he
majority cannot overturn FWS's statutory interpretation simply because it
disagrees with it."2 86 Judge Kozinski also noted that the EPA's decision to
consult under section 7(a)(2) with respect to its transfer decision was
simply the result of the national office in Washington, D.C., overruling the
EPA regional office. 2 87 He also noted that even though the EPA may have
consulted under section 7(a)(2) before transferring CWA permit-issuing
authority to six other states besides Arizona, there is no evidence that the
EPA's national office had made those decisions to consult under the
280 d
281 See Defenders of Wildlfe III, 450 F.3d 394, 395-402 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
282 Id. at 396.
283 Id. at 397 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).284 Id. at 398 n.1.285 Id. at 397.
286 d
287 Id. at 396.
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ESA.288 He also noted that an agency "is not locked into a particular
position forever; it is entitled to change its view over time." 289
Judge Kozinski additionally criticized the Defenders of Wildlife
majority for incorrectly interpreting section 7(a)(2) as providing that "once
EPA expressed concern that its action might affect endangered species
[and requested formal consultation with FWS], it had already conclusively
determined that its decision was covered by the ESA ... [and] once FWS
is consulted for guidance, it is precluded from ever determining that the
ESA is inapplicable." 2 90 Judge Kozinski stated that instead, under section
7(a)(2) "[i]f the [action] agency thinks endangered species might be
affected, it must [consult and] ask FWS whether its supposition is
correct-whether its action would, in fact, affect endangered species-
and, if so, what the impact on endangered species will be." 291 Judge
Kozinski asserted that the Defenders of Wildlife II majority's holding "is
nonsensical, undermining the entire consultative process that the ESA
establishes and striking down FWS's perfectly reasonable interpretation of
the ESA," which is entitled to Chevron deference.292
Even more significantly, Judge Kozinski noted that the Defenders
of Wildlife II majority wrongly "concludes that section 7 of the ESA
required EPA to take endangered species into account when making the
transfer decision, notwithstanding the plain contrary language of the CWA
. . . [and] thus transformed the ESA into an overriding mandate that
trumps an agency's obligations under its own governing statute." 293 He
pointed out that the "majority simply finds that the word 'discretionary' in
[50 C.F.R. § 402.03] is meaningless ... [and] that [section 7(a)(2) of the]
ESA applies to anything 'authorized, funded or carried out' by a federal
agency, whether discretionary or not,"294 without giving FWS's
288 id
289 Id. (citing Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1988)).290 Id. at 397.
291 Id.
292 d293 Id. at 398.
294 Id. (citations omitted).
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interpretation of the regulation in its Biological Opinion the substantial
deference it is due.2 95
Judge Kozinski stressed that Judge Thompson, in his dissent of the
Defenders of Wildlife II decision, correctly found that "EPA had no
authority under the CWA to consider endangered species when making the
transfer decision . . . [and that] [o]nce the nine criteria [of section 402(b)
of the Clean Water Act] were met, . . . the CWA mandated the transfer;
nothing in ESA section 7 allows-let alone requires-the EPA to ignore
the clear language of the CWA." 296 He added:
[w]e cannot presume that Congress repealed the CWA's
categorical mandate sub silentio, simply by passing the
ESA . .. [and] even if we were inclined to believe, as the
panel majority does, that the CWA and ESA need to be
reconciled, FWS's regulation is a perfectly plausible way to
do so: By limiting the ESA's applicability to
"discretionary" agency actions, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, the
regulation avoids the supposed conflict the majority has
created between the ESA and governing statutes-like the
CWA-that mandate agency action. 297
295 Id. at 398 n.l.
296 Id. at 398.297 Id Judge Kozinski also argued that the decision of the Defenders of Wildlife II
majority also "flies in the face of" the Supreme Court's causation test in Public Citizen,
which provides that "where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect dues to its
limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a
legally relevant 'cause' of the effect." Id. at 398-99 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004)). Judge Kozinski correctly stated that under this
holding of Public Citizen, "[b]ecause EPA had no discretion under the CWA to prevent
the transfer of the permitting authority to Arizona, it did not need to consider the
transfer's effects on endangered species." Id. at 399. Public Citizen's causation test is
discussed supra note 197.
Judge Kozinksi also asserted that the approach that he and Judge Thompson
advocated follows the holdings in Am. Forest and Platter River; and that Conservation
Law Found and the Eighth Circuit's Defenders of Wildhife decision do not support the
majority's position because "[b]oth cases addressed situations where the governing
statute and the ESA were complementary, not where the governing statute precluded
consideration of endangered species as the CWA does." Id at 400-01, 401 n.5.
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V. CONCLUSION
Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent to the denial of rehearing en
banc in Defenders of Wildlife H that "[i]f the ESA were as powerful as the
majority contends, it would modify not only EPA's obligation under the
CWA, but every categorical mandate applicable to every federal
agency," 298 including agency issuance of permits and licenses under
statutes stating that an agency "shall" issue a license or permit when
specified criteria are present that do not allow the agency to act to protect
species listed under the ESA from the types of harm proscribed by section
7(a)(2) of the ESA. As Judge Kozinski stated, "[w]e should be particularly
chary of holding that the ESA made such sweeping changes when the
agency charged with implementing the statute has adopted a regulation
allowing the ESA to coexist peacefully with all categorical mandates . . ..
There is no justification for nullifying countless congressional directives
by casting aside the agency's authoritative interpretation of the ESA ...
i,299
Consequently, courts should continue to interpret 50 C.F.R. §
402.03 as limiting the application of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to
affirmative agency actions for which the agency has the discretionary
authority to act in a manner to protect species listed under the ESA from
the types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA should be held to be inapplicable to the ministerial
actions of an agency under another statute that states the agency "shall"
perform when specified criteria are present that do not permit the agency
to act in a manner that can protect species listed under the ESA from the
types of harm proscribed by section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Furthermore, the
specific holding of the Defenders of Wildlife II majority, that section
7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to an EPA decision to transfer CWA section
402 permit-issuing authority to a state, should be reversed, so that EPA is
not required to comply with any of the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA when the EPA is deciding whether to transfer CWA section 402
9 Id. at 399 n.4.
299 id
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permit-issuing authority to a state.
96
